82 Phil. 230
"Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.
"These examinees claim, to have seen mimeographed copies of the questions in one subject, days before the tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.
"Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.
"The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the city.
"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the supreme court institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations.
The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ. of the student body of the University of the Philippines, on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of some private technical schools.
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of allowing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that this Court is and for many years has 'been, in charge of the Bar examinations held every year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948. Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar examinations yearly, appoints a committee of bar examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the Committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in -the regularity and cleanliness of the Bar examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the the names of his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, "but Parazo consistently refused to make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed tor. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a report thereof to the Court in bane, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this court dated October 7. 1948, which reads as follows:
"In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14, 1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held In August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author of said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Llarceliano R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court.
"From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his cooperation, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination anomaly. Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item, and to warn, him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of Court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court"of the result.
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13, 1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the state demands and this court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who were appointed by this Court to prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examination papers; and last but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examinations questions and is determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the investigation was postponed to October 15. 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel, Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen, Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day, October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Atty. Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act Ko. 53, the first section of which reads as follows;
"Section 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of Hie state."
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the security of the state, that is to say that only when national security or public safety is involved, may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a matter of fact, the vote of the justices is not unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53 particularly, the Senate where it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill prepared by 3enator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his information or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change, by adding to the end of Sec. 1 the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest."
When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest", claiming that said clause would kill the purpose of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest", said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of the state require that the names of the informants be published or known. lie gave as one example a case of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public interest" at the' end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase "interest of the state", claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this last amendment was approved, and this phrase is new found in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety", one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment proposed by senator Sotto, chan3ing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state", was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by sane Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." was approved without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangably by some Senators with the phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee precided by Senator Ouenco, used the words "public interest", when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he used in ids speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the state" (interes del Estado). Again, although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest", Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state". This understanding of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangability of the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the state" may account for the readiness or lack of objection on the part of tho Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state".
In referring to a case wherein, the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft 'of the plans of fortifications, Senator Guenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by "interest of the state"; it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state"; but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state; can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, "security of the state" and "public safety", are not uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety", is used in Art. Ill, Sec. 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise"; and Art. VII, Sec. 10 (2) of the same Constitution provides that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.
The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, Crimes against National Security. Then, more recently, the phrase "national security" was used in section 2, and the phrase"public security" was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen. only to cases where the "security of the state", i.e., "national security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public safety". "national security", or "public security" of which it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state", it extended the scope and the limits of the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader than "security of the state". Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything tho of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase "interest of the state" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of national importance in which the whole state and nation, not only a branch, or instrumentality thereof such, as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials, treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state". Under constitutional provision, Art. VIII, Sec. 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practicing law or occupying important Government posts requiring membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are welded to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine liar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as -well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers thec.selves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by pas sine the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner . It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the. most popular in these' islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the justice of the Peace Courts, Provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the u&r to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of liar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparation, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made use of liar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the bar examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that Hie re is no need of much lav; study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the committee of examiners at the request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, one or two or more of them that through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly, and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has the overall supervision and control over the examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think dnd believe, it still enjoys, night be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaningof the pirrase "interest of the state", involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire legal profession of tills country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee of Bar examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act rlo. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of Courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the Court, (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138) As we have previously stated, the revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants is essential and necessary to the investigation of tiie charge contained in the publication already mentioned,
It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, his informants, law graduates and b.r examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly, consisting of the alleged leakage of the Bar Examination questions, to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Exainination questions in at least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coining from a certain university, one week before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation said that examination, questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing; to testify that he actually saw said alleged copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar Examination questions, although they as well as the University where they came from, was known; and even the lav; subjects to which, the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know even the identity of respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There were eight subjects, each subject belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers involved, in the hands of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers boar no names or identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until ' the books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, evidence on the identity of the persons in possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of the law subjects or subjects involved, the University from which said persons core, this Court does not feel capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence, Under these circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news item, said charges are considered and held to be without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted info neat ion on which to start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the public dealing with 1iie members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of this Court in preparing the Examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards, are unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of many or all of the examination, papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too lone, as a result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the other hand, if too many obtain a passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before examination day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by "being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel J, Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news item or story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this decision, and that, in refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, Sec. 7, Rules of Court) Ordinarily, in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However, considering that cases like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of the members of this Court arrest and confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozeate, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.,
The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned "by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify conclusively the finding of the majority that respondent is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of this Court.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It would protect him only if we could agree with his theory that the words "interest of the state" used in the law should be read to mean security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the whole text of Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can be gleaned in the Senate Journal, or in the grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the words in question, that can Justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they embrace within the small circle of public security or safety of the state.
The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts within which the ideas of security or safety occupy a place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is no legal basis for us to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a minimum that, if given effect, would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional enactment. Such would be violative of the Constitution.
In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the Senate committee that would limit the privilege up to the point where it runs in conflict with the wide area of public interest, the opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation was pushed up to the place where the privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No one Is authorized to push that line of limitation still farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We have to stop at the line of limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the law.
No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in Congress, we are powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject in the statute a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat the legislative intent. There is no alternative for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and wait for a more receptive mood of Congress.
Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court demands obedience for their effectiveness. Administration of justice is impossible with unenforceable Judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial orders is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing because it means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will never allow such a thing to obtain.
Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive department or without a legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress functions only one third of the year. During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation does not suffer any impairment. It can even be said that during those two thirds of the year there is more normalcy than during the Congressional session when legislative reforms and the enactment of new laws cannot but produce some public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the way of life of the people. No one can imagine the possibility of an orderly human society without some effective system of administration of justice, functioning without long interruptions .
While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and this Supreme Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or defiance, of its orders, and it should mete out to all affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without fear or favor, the guilty parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty imposed upon respondent.
Respondent is punished under Section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared invalid in our opinion in the Harden case, L-239. The provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in Section 6 of Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum not exceeding P1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there are mitigating circumstances that attenuate respondent's responsibility, youthfulness, honest but wrong belief in the existence of a privilege, absence of substantial harm, we should not impose upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that which we imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-2781, the very one which, as can be gleaned from the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of Republic Act No. 53
We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to reduce the imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the revelation exacted from him. The penalty should be measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the discretion of the guilty one. His future revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his responsibility for the offense he has already perpetrated. His past disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future action. The past cannot be remade. What has been done cannot be undone. These are verities no one can eloign.
We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.
DISSENTING
PARAS, J.,
If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star Reporter the story (Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the decision of the majority, in good faith and in a spirit of public service, he voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants, thereby enabling this Court, conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to "institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a spirit of public service, he should at least have tried to secure their consent to the revelation. The point I want to underscore is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing stories as in substantiating their truth. And if I am constrained to dissent from the ruling of the majority, it is only because the respondent, in my opinion, cannot legally be compelled to make the revelation, in view of Republic Act No. 53 which this Court is bound to enforce providing that "the publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in believing that the phrase "interest of the State", as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters affecting the security or safety of the state.
In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by Senator Sotto provided for absolute immunity. The committee on revision of laws, however, inserted an amendment by adding the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." Senator Sotto's attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the remarks of the Chairman of the committee presently to be mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to change the words "public interest" into "interest of the state", a proposal that was readily accepted. Hence, the use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.
Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the state", as intended by the lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall that the original intention of the author of the bill was to provide for absolute immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated by any subsequent exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the deliberations of the lawmakers. For instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing Senator Sotto1s advocacy of absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause "-unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," added to the original bill, Senator Cuenco gave the example of a newspaperman who publishes an informacion regarding theft of plans of forts and fortifications, in which case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interns publico y el interns misrao del Estado requieran que se publique el nombre del informante." Ajain, after proposing the change of "public interest" to "interest of the state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as to the essential difference between the two phrases, explained that "La diferencia esta?( en que puede haber un caso de espionage, corno el citado por el Senador Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Sstado y no se puede discutir al autor, y la frase 'public interest' es muy eldstica. En cambio, si se pone 'interest of the state', claranente se entenderfa que mediando el interns del estado, el periodista estard ohligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but not least, it should be noted that the Act in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the repetition of the case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of the information contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the respondent, the security or safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the state" was intended to be limited to cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and fortifications and espionage), given during the deliberations which solely affect the security or safety of the state.
It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety,"'national security," or "public security," or whether "public interest" and "interest of the state" were interchangeably used in the discussions, as long as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers definitely knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey. Conjectures cannot prevail over the clear legislative Intent.
The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to frustrate the main purpose of the lav;. This would further make the law more consonant with the spirit of the constitutional provisions that "the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise" (Art. III, Sec. 1, par.5), and that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the press (Art. Ill, Sec. 1, par. 8).
It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of his information does not absolutely prevent this Court from verifying, by any reasonable and feasible means, the truth of the alleged anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of the story in question, to admit the accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail because of lack of evidence or of the refusal of those who know to come out and testify.
In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.
D I S I D E N T E
BRIONES, M.,
Deploro no poder estar conforme con la deoision de la mayorla aobre este inoidente. Me preooupa oomo al qua mas el buen nombre, el prestigio, la respetabilidad de esta Corte Suprema baluarte inexpugnable de las libertades y fueros oiviles pero hay algo que me precupa mas y es la substanoia misma de esas libertades y fueros. En realidad, en tanto la Corte Suprema orece y se agiganta en el ooncepto publico en cuanto ella se mantiene enhiesta en la oima de la cumbre donde le ooloca su categorfa y constituye la ultima esperanza del oiudadano ouando en su derredor todo pareoe crujir y requebrajarse.
El recurrido, Angel Parazo, es reportero del periodioo diario "The Star Reporter" que se edita en Manila. A raiz de los ultimos exfimenes de abogacfa, publico un artlculo inforaativo en el que se decla que algunos examinandos hablan visto copias de algunos cuestionarioa antes de la celebracion de los examenes y que dichas copias fueron utilizadas por los examinandos procedentes de cierta universidad privada. El Magistrado encargado de los examenes emplazd al recurrido para que explicase la noticia y diese los nombres de sus informantes a fin de poder investigarles minuciosamente y ver la manera de adoptar las medidas que fueran procedentes. El recurrldo compareci6, pero se nego en absoluto a revelar el origen de su informacion. De ahi el presente expediente por desacato.
In re Parazo.
La controversia gira en torno a la interpretacion del art. 1 de la ley de la republica No. 53, aprobada por el Congreso en su liltimo periodo de sesiones. Dicao artlculo se lee oomo sigue:
"El publioista, editor o reportero debidamente aoreditado de cualquier periddico, revista o publicion perifidioa de circulacion general, no puede ser compelido a revelar el origen de cualquier noticia o informacion que le haya sido transmitida en oonfianza y que haya aparecido en dicho periddico, revista o publicacion, a menos que el tribunal o una camara del Congreso o un oomitS del mismo halle y determine que el interns del Estado requiere que se haga tal revelacion".
Podemos tomar oonocimiento judicial de las motivajionss ds asta ley oomo tema de historia contemporanea. Hace dos anoa un juez del Tribunal del Pueblo (People's Court) Ianzo publicamente algunos ataques contra esta Corte. Un periodista, Benito Sakdalan, 36 hizo eco de diclaos ataques publicando bajo su rirma y responsabilidad un artloulo informativo acerca del particular. A instancia de parte, un Magistrado de esta Corte mandd emplazar a Sakdalan para una investisacid'n del incidente. Sakdalan oomparecid, pero cuando se le preguntd de quien Habia recibido su ini'ormacion, negdse en absoluto a hacer la revelacion exiglda. El Magistrado de referenda ordend entonoes que se le detuviera a Sakdalan en la escribanla de esta Corte por dos dlas, en castigo por lo que se oreyo" un desacato.
El caso Sakdalan causd un revuelo tremendo en la prensa, despertando entre sus camaradas una general simpatla perreotamente explicable. Sakdalan se convirtid en nSroe del dla, por lo menos en las oolumnas de los iperiddioos. El tono predominant de los comentarios periodlsticos era que Sakdalan estaba justificado en su negativa, que el sagrado de la conciencia del periodista debia ser respetado, y que la orden de detenciSn constitula una violacion de la libertad de la prensa. El revuelo repercutio en los clrculos legislatives, culiainando an la aprobacion de la ley de la republica No. 53 que nos ocupa.
Resulta importante y iltll destacar este fondo historico, pues por ello se explican ciertas oaracteristioas del proyecto de ley original presentado en el Senado. Una de las mas salientes, por ejemplo, era lo absoluto del privilegio: no se provela ninguna excepcion, ninguna salvedad, no pudiSndose obligar al periodista a revelar el origen de su in.rormacio'n bajo ninguna cirounstancia. La medida tiene anteoedentes bien conooidos en nuestra misma legislacion. Primeramente en el antiguo Cddigo de Procedimlento Civil, y aaora en el Reglamento de los Tribunales, figuran ciertas disposiclones que restringen la libertad para testificar o el dereclio de examinar a ciertos testigos sobre determinadas materias. Verbigraoia, en nuestra ley sobre pruebas y evidencias, regla 123, seccion 26, se provee lo slguiente:
* * * * * * * *
"(e) El abogado no puede, sin el consentiraiento de su oliente, ser examinado respecto a una conversacion que tuvo con este, o aoerca de algtln consejo que le diera coiao tal, ni tampooo el secretario, taq,ulgrafo o empleado de un abogado, sin el consentimiento del cliente y del abogado, pueden ser examinados respecto a un liecno cuyo conocimiento nayan adq.uirido en el desempefio de sus deberes.
"(f) A ninguna persona debidamente autorizada para ejercer la medicina, la oirugla o la obstetricia, se le obligara en alguna causa civil, a revelar, sin el oonsentimiento del paoiente, cualquier intorme que dioiia persona haya adquirido al asistir al paciente con caraoter profesional, que necasariamente hubo de adquirir para poder obrar con tal caracter, y que tienda a denigrar la dignidad del paciente.
"(g) El ole'rigo o sacerdote no puede ser examinado sin el conaentiaiiento de su penitents, respecto a la confesi6"n que le haya necno s"ste, en au caracter sacerdotal, y en el cum.pllmlento de los deberes que le impone la religion a que pertenece.
"(h) El funoionario piiblico no puede ser examinado mientras este en el ejercicio de su cargo, o despues, reapecto a lo que se le nubiese oomunlcado en confidencla ofioial, ouando el tribunal determine que el interns ptibllco se perjudicara con la revelacion".
Es indudable que la medida coloca al periodista en la oategorla de estas exenciones especialisimas, situandole al nivel del sacerdota, del abogado y del medico. El Senador Cuenco, ponente del proyecto de ley al ponerse a discusion, dijo en parts lo que sigue a modo de explicacion de sus elevados fines:
"El proyecto de ley que esta ahora bajo la oonsideracion de esta Camara tiene por objeto eximir al director, redactor o reporter de un periddico, de la obligacio'n de revelar el nombre de la persona de quien haya obtenido una informaclSn, a menos que el interfis del Estado asi lo requlera. La legislacion que se trata de diotar no es del todo nueva. Nuestra ley procesal considera como privilegiada y digna de ser mantenida en secreto toda comunicacion reoiblda por el sacerdote, el abogado y el me'dico en el ejercicio de au miniterio o profesion. El proyeoto no solo dignigica y eleva la profesion periodisdica slno que da facilidades. a los periodicos para obtener noticias. (El subrayado es nuestro.)
"El periodismo, mas que un medio para obtener bienes materiales, es un apostolado, un sacerdocio. El periodista no es un mercacnifle, sino una persona llamada a cumplir una mision elevada, sublime, augusta. La hoja periodica es catedra. De ella irradla la lua que difunde la oultura, la instruccion, los principios Sticos y morales, las reglas de una oiudadanla nonrada y patridtioa", (Diario de seaiones del Senado, Julio 9, 1946.)
Elevar y ennoblecer la profesion del periodista y dar facilidades a los periddicos para obtener una informacion honrada, veridica, imparcial y construotiva cometido esencial de una buena prensa, digna del apelativo de Quarto poder del Estado tal es el objeto fundamental de la medlda, en frase definidora del Senador Cuenco, ponente de la misma y chairman del comite de revision de leyes del Senado. Es importante destacar esta motivacion legislativa, pues ello nos ayuda, al interpretar la ley, a determinar si el privilegio debe ser entendido rigidamente en oontra o liberalmente en pro del periodista. Estimo qne la indioada exposicion de motivos justifica, mas aun, requiere una interpretacion liberal.
Como queda diono, en el proyecto de ley original presentado por el Senador Sotto el privilegio se establecia de una manera absoluta, incondicional? Sin embargo, el comite" de revision de leyea del Senado al oual se habla endoaado el bill, lo informd con una enmienda, anadiendo al final del art. 1 transcrito arriba las siguientes palabras: "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest".* Al discutirse, sin embargo, el proyecto en pleno Senado, Sotto formula una enmienda mediante la supresion de la salvedad insertada por el comite", tratando asi de restaurar la fraseologfa original del proyecto. Cuenco, en su earficter de ponente y chairman del comite" de revision de leyes, de opuso a la enmionda Sotto por supresion y siguid un debate bastante ertenso. Sotto dijo enfaticamente que "esas palabreas deben suprimirse porque matan el objeto del proyecto de lay. Si, como lia dicho el sesudo presidente del comite de revision de leyes, el pretende oolooar al periodista eti el mismo nivel del sacerdote, tengamos en cuenta que en el caso de este no hay esa excepcion".
Cuenco, cerrando el debate, hlzo las siguientes manifestaoiones en contra de la enmienda Sotto:
"EL SEN, CUENCO. Seftor Presidents, oomo ya Jae manifestado el Comite1 siente no poder acaptar la enmienda, porque puede haber oasos, quiza muy contados, en que el interns publioo y el interns mismo del Estado requieran que 3e publique el nombre del informante. Supongamos que un. periodiata publicara una informaol(5n referents al hurto o sustraocidSn de unoa pianos de fortalezas o de un sltio importante de defensa. Si la.inmunidad que se otorga al periodista fuese abaoluta, oomo la que se propone en la enmienda, el autor de la sustraccion podrla quedar impune.
"Senor Presidente: he sido periodista por espacio de veintioinco afloa y me laonro en serlo, antes que abogado, antes que legislador, pero, por lo mismo que tengo un oonoepto elevado de la profeaitfn no qulsiera que se dieae el oaso de que una traicion al Estado quedase impune: que nosotros llevasemos a extremos exagerados la proteccion que se da al periodista."
Puesta a votacion la enmienda, fue rechazada, votando a favor 3 y en contra 7.
Sotto, sin embargo, no se dio por enteramente derrotado. Esforzandose por sacar avants su proyeoto de ley con la menor oortapisa posible para la libertad de la prensa, propuso otra enmienda en el sentido de sustituir las palabras "public interest" con "interest of the State", de tal suerte que la salvedad se leyera oomo sigue: "unless tae court findg that such revelation is demanded by the intergst of the State", de tal suerte que la salvedad se leyera como sigue "unless the court finds that such revalation is demanded by the interest of the State."* Ya no hubo debate sobra esta enmienda; el mismo oomite la aoeptd", por boca de su chairman el Senador Cuenoo. : Puesta a votacion, la misma se aprobt5 por unanimidad. Sin embargo, antes de la votacitfn, el Senador Garcia pregunto" qua" diferencia mmfflauamftm esenoial habla entre las frases "public interest" e "interest or the State". Sotto contests que "la diferencia estfi en que puede naber un oaso de espionaje como el citado por el Senador' Cuenoo, delito en que esta1 interesado el Estado y no se puede descubrir al autor", mientras que, por otro lado, la frase "publio interest11 es muy elastica". "En cambio oontinud Sotto si se pone "interest of the State", claramente se entenderla que mediando el interns del Estado, el periodista estard obligado a revelar la fuente de su informaoifin". (Diario de sesiones del Senado, supra.)
De lo expuesto result a evidente que la sustitucio'n de la frase "public interest" por la de "interest of the State" no fue simplemente casual e inimportante, sino que fue harto deliberada, hecha con el propdsito de restringlr el alcanoe de la salvedad. Se dijo que la frase "public interest" es muy eldstica yi el Senado, en pleno, aceptd este pronunoiamiento. Asi que se puso "interest of the State" para denotar ue solo se podria obligar al periodista a descubrir, como testigo, la fuente de su informacion cuando el Estado estuviese vitalmente interesado en la materia; es decir, cuando estuviese envuelta la seguridad del Estado, de la Hacitfn, oonceptos que en este caso se oonfundirlan. El ejemplo del espionage citado por el Senador Cuenco, abona esta interpretacion. "Interes del Estado" tiene aqul un significado partioularfsimo, repelente de otros oasos exbranos a la seguridad nacional: ese significado no puede ser ma's que el interes del Estado en su propla vida, en su propia seguridad. No oaba extender el aloance da la frase a otros casos en que el Estado pudiera estar mas o menos interesado, porque si la intencion del Oongreso fuera esa, la frase "public interest" serf a ma's que suficiente, pues la misma oubre y comprende todos los matices publicos desde la seguridad del Estado y de la Nacion nasta el illtimo asunto en que el ptlblioo tuviera interns nasta cierto punto. Esta forma de interpretar es tanto ma's logioa, obligada, ouanto que los legisladores aceptaron y aprobaron unfinimemente el pronunoiamiento de que la frase "public interest" era muy eldstioa, eubrfa demasiado. Por tanto, nay que oonoluir que ouando adoptaron la frase sustitutiva "interest of tne State", la adoptaron para limitar, para res%ringir la salvedaa, reduoifindola solamente a algunos oasos, muy contados, segun expresion del Senador Cuenoo. Que oasos son estos? Entiendo que deben ser congeneres, es decir, del mismo tipo que el oaso de espionaje oitado; es declr, casos que afeoten vitalmente a la seguridad del Estado, de la Nacion. Verbigracia: una conspiracio'n para derrocar violentamente nuestra forma de gobierno y establecer en su lugar una dictadura comunista totalitaria al estllo sovie'tico, seria uno de esos muy contados de que habla el Senador ponente. No cabe aplicar, extender la frase a oasos de otra espeoia, de otro genero, porque eso equivaldrfa a establecer un "standard", una orma de interpretaoion arbitraria, nasta caprichosa, como mas adelante voy a demostrar, apreoiando que el interSs del Estado esta entraflado en algunos asuntos y matices de oaracter publico y excluyendolo, sin embargo, de otros, y en esto sin mas guta y nonaa que la opinion harto debatible del juez o tribu+
nal sentenoiador aobre lo que ea digno de ser oatalogado bajo la frase "interns del Estado" y sobre lo que no lo es.
Resulta evidente, de lo dicao, que no es exacto y oareoe de fundamento lo que en la decision de la mayorla ae afirma, a saber: que las frasea "public interest" o "interest of the State" se entendieron y usaron indlstintamente por los Senadores. Por el oontrario, el diario de seaiones del Senado demuestra de un modo inequivoco que los Senadbres sablan muy blen lo que haolan al oambiar una frase por otra y se daban perfeota ouenta de que el oambio no era simplemente gramatioal o lexioografioo, sino que entrafiaba una considerable diferencia en ouanto al significado y aloance de la salvedad o excepoitfn. Sabian muy bien que la frase "public interest" es muy elastica, al decir del Senador Sotto, y que desde luego tiene un maroo muoho mas amplio que la frase "interteat of the State". La presuncion es que los legisladores toman muy en serio la tarea de legislar y que cuando oambian una frase por otra lo hacen no por simple oapriolio, sino con verdadera deliberacion. La tarea legislativa no es un juego de ninos. Pero que mejor prueba de la diferenoia entre ambos conceptos que la misma admiaifin de la mayorla en su. decision al decir que "interest of the State" is not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may include most anything tho of minor Importance but affecting the public"1 * * *?
La endoblez de la teorla de la mayorfa salta a la viata si se examinan sus lmplicaciones y conseouencias. Par que decide la mayoria que en el presents oaso se halla envuelto el interes del Estado y que, por tanto, el reourrido estfi obligado a revelar la fuente de su inforniacion y si no lo nace inourre en desacato, punibla oon prision? Por varias razones que se exponen en la decision, entre las ouales se destacan las siguientes: (a) Los ezfimenes de abogados estfin colocados bajo la alta supervision de esta Corte Suprema, cuyo prestlgio, buen nombre y respetabilidad es de supremo interns del Estado el oonservar y mantener; (b) Miles de abogados se nallan esparoidos por el pals ejerclendo su noble profesion, y oentenares si no miles se afiaden oada afio a esa vasta legion; asl que la Corte Suprema y esta enorme masa de letrados estAn vltalmente interesados en elevar el "standard" profesional, procurando que entren solo los idiones, moral e intelectualmente, y este interes oae tambien bajo la categoria de "interns del Estado"; (c) Aoaso por natural inclinacion, la abogaola es la profesion ma's popular en Filipinas; de ahl la abundanoia de oolegios y esouelas de ddreoho en donde estudian miles de jtfvenes de ambos sexos aspirando a ponerse la toga !de Marco Tulio; de ahi naturalmente tambien el interns ;4el Estado en que esa profesion tan popular no oaiga en [desore'dito, oosa que oourriria facilmente si los exdmenes de abogados no se efeotuasen propia y honradamente omo una prueba rlgida de la capaoidad y cardcter de los xaminandos, ciroulando previamente ouesti^ojiarios de oontrabando" tal como se ha denunciado en el artloulo informativo qua nos ooupa; (d) Entre log abogados se esooge el personal para la judicatura y la administracion de justieia magistrados, jueces de primera instancia, fisoales, jueces de paz y letrados en las diferentes ofioinas y agendas del gobierno; de ahf que sea naturalmente tambien interns del Estado el conservar la integridad y buen nombre de una profesitfn que proporciona al gobierno y a la nacion tan valiosos servidores y elementos; (e) En la pureza de los ezamenes de abogados estd envuelto no sdlo el buen nombre de la Corte Suprema oomo queda dioho, sino tambien el buen nombre de la junta examinadora y de los empleados de la Corte que intervienen y vigilan dichos examenes; asl que todo oargo de venalidad y corrupcion tiene que afectar a dioho buen nombre y proyeotar una sombra de sospecha sobre el mismo; de ahl que sea intare's del Bstado el que se investiguen implaoablemente los cargos para depurar los lieohos y hallar la verdad castigando a los culpables si los nay, y purificando de tal manera los ezamenes, pero si, por otro lado, los cargos resultaren falsos, reivindicando el buen nombre de los afectados; (f) En resumen, de lo dioho se sigue que los examenes de abogados tienen importancia nacional y, por tanto, oualesquier oargos de venalidad, oorrupcion e irregularidad tienen tambien importanoia nacional y es interfis del Estado el que se investiguen hasta el limite mfiiimo de las posibilidades legales.
En ultimo anfilisis, se puede decir que la mayorla estima enTuelto ei el presente caso el "interes del Estado", primero, porque se trata de la profesion de abogado profesion de noble y vasta significacion social, Jurfdioa y polltlca y, segundo, porque tratandose de acuaaoiones referentes a los examenes de abogados ouya supervision corresponde a esta Oorte Suprema, el buen nom.bre, el prestigio y la respetabilidad de este alto tribunal estan necesariamente afectados. Veamos ahora si la tesis puede resistir a un examen rlgido, objetivo.
No sere yo quien disouta o ponga en tela de juicio la prestancia, el elevado rango de la profesion de abogado a la cual me Ixonro en pertenecer. Pero que hay de las otras profesiones? Son ellas menos dignas de mereoer el aupremo interns del Eatado? Durante las deliberacionea sobre el presente asunto tuve ocasion de formular estaa preguntaa y otraa semejantea. Recuerdo que lnoluaive cite casos especificos preguntando, por ejemplo, si en los examenes de me1dicos, farmaceuticos, ingenieros, dentistas y nurses, no podrla tambien oonsiderarse envue.lto el interns del Estado si al igual que en este asunto se formulasen graves cargos de irregularidad, corrupcion y venalidad. Respecto al caso de los me'dicos no obtuve una contestaciton categdrioa, definitiva; pero con relacitfn a las otraa profesiones, la respuesta tu6 decididamente negativa; reapecto a ellas, no oabrla invooar el interns del Sstado su rango, su signlfioacion social no justificarlan tal invocaciin. Ahora veo que en la decision de la mayorla el ejerfticio de la medlcina ae incluye entre los "casos y.materias de importanoia nacional, en los ouales el Estado o la nacion entera, y no so1o un ramo o instrumento del mismo como una provincia, una cludad o un pueblo, o una parte del ptlblico, est& interesado o podrfa quedar afectado1'. Aal que, a juiclo de la mayorla, el ejeroioio de la mediolna es al pareeer de fndole tan nacional y tan importante oomo el ejercicio de la abogaola para los efectog del ooncepto "intere's del Estado"; al paso que las otras profesionea y vocaciones quedan derinitivamente excluldaa del coto privilegiado.
Los farmaceuticos, sin embargo, podrian naturalmente formular las siguientes preguntas: Por quo se va a postergar nuestra nonrada y beneme'rita profeaifin? no nos cuesta tanto tiempo y tantoa esruerzos, si no m&s, nacer la carrera qua al abogado, verbigraela? no prestamos acaso a la sooiedad, a la numanidad, un aervioio tan util, tan indispensable y tan importante como el de cualquier otro profesional? no somos quienes preparamos oon infinito ouidado las drogas y medicamentos que prescribe y reoeta el medico? no esta en nuestras mano3 la salud, la vida, e ineluso la muerte de los oiud&danos, de los hombres? por qua", pues, se va a aentenoiar que el interes del Estado no esta vinoulado en nuestra profesion?
Por su parte, los ingenieros de todas clasesciviles, induatrialea, qulmicos, meoanicos, navales, mineros, etc. podrlan nacer estas embarazosas preguntaa: "Por que todos los mimos y oarioias van a ser para los abogados? tnada mfis que porqtte la mayor parte del tiempo nos ponemos la Jiumllde blusa del obrero y estamos casi siompre suciosla suciedad iniierente al sudor y mugre del trabajo? iao oonstruimos acaso los oaminos, ios puentea, los slstemas de aguas, los sistemas de relos nermosos y enormes edifioios partioulares y pilblicos, las ingentes ffibricas, en una palabra, todo eso que constituye la maravilla de los presentes tiempos, tradueiendo en realidad tangible lo que no parecfa ser mas que looa fantasia de la imaginacion de los poetas? 4 no hemos acaso conquistado el secreto divino de los a'tomos, desencadenando, es Terdad, las fuerzas ciegas de la destrucoion sobre el mundo, pero tamblen abriendo para el g^nero huniano vastos panoramas y perspectivas de progreso y bienestar cuasl ilimitado? Se dice que la abogacfa es la carrera ma's popular y ma's codiciada en Filipinas, pero tno exists el peligro de que esta popularidad se eats' romentando insensatamente a expensas de la vitalidad de la nacid"n? ino se oree acaso llegado el momento de que los caudilloa y direotores del pengamiento en este pals emprendan una seria cruzada para orientar las aficiones yenergias de nuestra juventud hacia oarreras mfis prficticas y ma's construotivas no solo para ellos partioularmente, sino sobre todo para la naoifin? ipor qu6 se ra a consagrar precisamente con una sentenoia judicial nada raenos que del ma's alto tribunal la supremaola de la profesifin de abogado en este pala, en desdoro de las otras protesiones, por que?"
Y ast, por el estilo, las otras profesiones podrlan leolamar y pretender con Justicia que tienen tanta categorfa como los abogados para que se considers aplicable a ellas el concepto jurldioo "interes del Estado" de que habla la ley de la repilblioa No. 53 que nos ocupa. Y si esto fuese asi, esto es, se estimase envuelto el "interes del Estado" en oasi todas las materias, verbigracia, hasta en los examenes de nurses, al punto de que interns del Estado equivaldrla prficticamente a interns publico que" quedarla entonces del privilegio conoedido por dicha ley a la prensa? ino serla ma's bien una letra muerta, como predijo el Senador Sotto al pedir la supresi(5n de la salvedad o excepcion?
Se dice, con cierto enfasis, que la profesion de abogado tiene una calidad ezcepcional, un rango privllegiado, porque de ella se escogen y nombran los magistrados, los jueces de primera instancia, los jueces de paz y los fiscales, en una palabra, el personal bdsico de la admini stracion de justicia. Se na insinuado inclusive que de esa profesion surgen regularmente los liders pollticos y sociales de las naciones y pueblos. Comencemos por esto tlltimo. Tienen los abogados la excluslva delliderato pilblico y sooial del mundo? Esto lo dirla un panegirista de la profesionen un discurso de rin de ourso de un oolegio de leyes, pero la nistoria nos dice que el liderato no ha sido nunca cuestion profesional, sino que el lider ha surgido come un precipitado individual o social indepenlas protesiones y oficios. Ha nabido y hay en el mundo muonos oaudillos no abogados y, por oierto, los mejores no siempre Jian sido siempre los de esta clase. Bs verdad que nubo un Lincoln abogado uno de los caudillos ma's sobresali entes que la demooracia produjera en el mundo; pero tambien iiubo un Washingtonagrimensor padre de la naolon que produjo a lincoln. Y el oaso de Tilipinas es todavla mas tlpioo como demostracion de la tesia de que el caudillaje no es cuestitfn profesional. 3omo todo el mundo sabe, nuestros dos mas grandes caudiLlos en el pasado no eran abogados: Rizal era medico; y Bonifacio, el llamado padre de la democracia filipina, no soo no era profeslonal, sino que apenas era nada acade'miaamente hablando era un simple bodeguero, un verdadero plebeyo. Sin embargo, esto no le impidid", mientras Traguaba el acero oandente del Katipunan, empaparse en las gestas de la revolucion franoesa leyendo a Tniers en eapafiol. (Cuantos de nuestros abogados di&no sea entre parentesis sobre todo de la epooa de Boniracio, habrdn leido, o siquiera visto el forro, de la Revoluoltin Francesa de Thiers?)
Es verdad que el personal bfisico de la administracion de justioia estfi oompuesto de abogados, pero en la misma decision de la mayorla se reconoce que la administracid"n de justicia es so1o una de las principales funoiones del gobierno y a rengldn seguido se apunta el sistema de ensefianza publioa (public school system) como otra runcio'n de lmportanoia ^aacional. Entonces oabe preguntar; por que no se va a considerar tambien envuelto el "interes del Estado" en los examenes de maestros, sobre todo si son de servicio civil? No solo los maestros oonstituyen la base de nuestro sistema de ensenanza publioa, sino que inoluao tienen mas envergadura nacional porque se cuentan por miles, rormando la clase mfis numerosa de nuestros servidores publicos. Sin embargo, en opinion de la mayorla los maestros no tienen surioiente calibre como los abogados para que se entienda aplioable a ellos lla frase "interes del Estado" usada en la referida ley de la republioa No. 53. Este no es mas que uno de los absurdos a que conduce la arbitrariedad de la norma adoptada por la mayorla en su decision.
Analizare ahora el argumento aquiles de la mayoria. Se dice que el interes del Estado se nalla envuelto en el presente oaso porque de por medio anda el prestigio,el buen nombre de esta Corte Suprema en virtud de las facultades de alta supervision que ejeroe sobre los examenes de abogados. El que escribe estas lineas no cede i nadie en su celo por mantener incolume el prestigio de esta Corte; pero, al propio tiempo, no puede cerrar los ojos a la realidad, a saber; que no somo s mas que mo de los tres poderes del Estado; que estos poderes ion iguales y ninguno de ellos tiene mas prestigio que otro. Los examenes de abogados no tienen mas imortancia y envergadura nacional porque los supervisamos que, por ejemplo, los examenes de ingenieros y fariceilticos, cuyas juntas examinadoras son nombradas por el poder ejecutivo y son responsables ante el mismo. El poder ejeoutivo tiene tanto derecno como esta Corte para lar por su prestigio y buen nombre. Si, como al pareadmite la mayorla, el interns del Estado no se extiende a los examenes de ingenieros y farmaceuticos por er materia de suficiente monta nacional, luego tamdebe extenderse a los examenes de abogados tan afilo que la Corte Suprema tiene intima relaclfin con 5stos Tirtud de sus facultades de supervision, pues, oomo 4a dicho, ningiln poder es mfis prestigio so que el otrodesde luego esta Corte no, puede pretender ser mas los otros poderes del Estado.
Puede aduoirse, por analogia, otro buen argumento sn favor de la tests de esta diaidencia. Una as las garantlas constituoionales es la invlolabllidad del seoreto de la oomunioaoid'n y oorrespondenola, excepto ouando la seguridad publloa y el orden req.uieran otra oosa y meIdiante una orden legal del tribunal. (Constituoion de Filiplnas, art. III, sec. 5, bill de dereonoa.) Es verdad que la constitucion nabla de seguridad pilblica, mientras que la ley de la Repilblica No. 53 habla de interes del Estado, pero la letra aqui no es lo importante, sino la identldad del fondo, de la substanoia del privilegio.
Se ha inainuado que si se penaitiera al periodista ocultar la fuente de su informacion tratandose de asuntos pilblicos de reoonoolda seriedad, ello fomentarla la iny la cobardla entre los ciudadanos, sanoionando la byeotada anonimidad, aguello de "tirar la piedra esooniendo la mano". Si argumento tiene cierta ruerza, pero a de doble rilo. Si se admlte la falta o rlojedad del alor clvioo entre los ciudadanos que de malo nay en que, ientras se fomente y rortalezca esa virtud oon la eduoion de las masas y los nabitos de una oiudadanla mili, se deje ' a la prensa oierta latltud y oierta liberBid para sacar el mejor partido posible de la anonimidad (formatlva en sus campaftaa contra la oorrupoion, los abusos y las anomaltas? Con esto se lograrla, por lo kos, que la prensa cumpllese y realizase su cometido s'aial oon oierta efioacia desoorriendo parte del velo, lejando que el Estado, oon sus agendas de investigaeion 1 crimen y de los chanonullos, naga el resto. Por ejemplo, en el presente casoj ipor que1 la Corte Suprema ,va a lnsistir en aotuar como si fuese una agenoia policiaca? por que va a tratar al periodista como si este fuese un detective, obligfindole a revelar todos sus datos, incluso los nombres de sus informantes? Nos quejamos de nuestra impotencia ante el silencio oontuma'z del racurrido: ipor que1 no entregar el oaso a la National Bureau of Investigation la famosa NBI cuya eficiencia todos reconocen y dejar que la misma sea quien se enbienda con el reourrido y manege la informacifin de este con la tSenica y medios de que dispone para sus investigaciones?
En realidad, el periodista ya rinde un buen servicio cuando denunoia una anomalla si bien reservandose el nombre de su informante. Por qug castigarle si insiste en conservar su secreto, excepto cuando medie la seguridad del Estado y de la Hacion, ilnica salvedad que esta blece la ley? Esta bien que no se le premie o aplauda por el bien que hace, pero icastigarle? Es el colmo!
Es que, se dira, el periodista puede obrar de mala fe denunciando unas anomalfas imaginarias y provooando loon ello un tremendo esoandalo con todos los danos y perjuicios que de ello pueden seguirse para el buen nombre la reputacion de las personas y de las instituoiones. Es verdad. No se puede negar que hay bribones en la prensa esos que en otras ocasiones he llamado "tulisaneg de la pluma", peores a veces que los salteadores de caminos. Tampoco se puede negar que hay lo que se llama prensa amarilla, dedicada a cultivar el sensacionalismo malsano y morboso, Pero el remedio contra Ssto no eg la tley de la republioa No. 53 que nos ocupa: existen otros remedlos, unos en el cxS&igo penal; otros, en la misma de desacato; y otroa, en el desprecio, repulsa y hostilidad de la misma opinion ptlblloa, ya ajie, despu$s de todo, la prensa no puede viyir sino del favor ptTblloo. Poco deapiaSs de la liberacion un periodista publico" tin artlculo virulento denunciando supueatas anomallas e irregularidades en relacion con loa examenea de abogados celebrados durante la ooupaoitfn japonesa. Se le emplazo para que probase aua oargos. No loa probo; era evldente a mala fe. Le oastigamos por deaacato y si no se le Lmpuso una pena mas severa fus" porque canto la palinodia retractandose. (Vease In re Francisoo Brillantes, por desacato.)
La ley de la republica No. 53 es una medlda liberal, progresiva, ooncebida y promulgada para capaoitar la prensa a realizar su transcendental cometido del mejor modo posible. La prensa es una de las ma's preeiosaa conquisy posesiones de nuestra civllizacion. Se puede prescindir de algunas cosas jamfis de una prensa libre, veraz, eficlente. Sin este formidable implemento social, la deaocraoia no se puede concebir. Por tanto, la ley debiera interpretase libremente, hasta el maximo grado de liberalidad, compatible con la vida y seguridad del Estado.
El caso Sakdalan, que se origino en esta Corte, fue la causa ooasional que determine la aprobacion de esa . Es, en verdad, una deplorable coincidencia que el caso sakdalan so repita en esta misma Corte con el presente caso de Parazo, y en peores terminos y circuntancias, pues mientraa a Sakdalan se le tuvo arrestado por solamente dos dias, a Parazo se le va a encarcelar ahora por un mes. Mucho me temo que esta decision. enturble una ejecutoria tan. preclara de liberallsmos oomo la que abrillanta nnaatra jurlsprudencla en materlas sobre libertad de imprenta.
Voto en favor de la exoneracion del reourrido.
Respondent to be confined in jail for one month.
* "A menos que el tribunal encuentre que el interes del Estado requiere que se haga tal revelacion."
1 "el interes del Estado" no es tan amplio y comprensivo como ' el interes publico", el cual incluye casi todo aunque de menor importancia con tal que afecte al publico * * * .
1] Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil., 630.