G.R. No. 129096 - Zarate vs. Commission on Elections

The case involves the 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections in Barangay Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
Three candidates vied for the position of SK Chairman, with the vote counts initially reported as follows:

The Board of Canvassers of the barangay proclaimed Julian Lallave, Jr. as the duly elected SK Chairman based on the vote count.

On May 16, 1996, petitioner Marivic Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court of Malasiqui, Pangasinan (SK Election Protest No. 04).
Key allegations in the protest included:

The presence of ballots bearing the initials “JL” was irregular, as these votes were in favor of Lallave, Jr., even though the protest petitioner contended that such ballots should have been voided.
It was argued that the votes with “JL” were stray votes — improperly cast or marked — and did not identify any candidate with a verified name or nickname “JL.”
The protest also argued that in case the questionable ballots were excluded, the vote tally would reverse, leading to petitioner Zarate being rightful winner.

On September 9, 1996, the Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner Zarate:

Eight of Lallave, Jr.’s original 46 votes were declared marked (invalid), reducing his count to 38.
One vote among Zarate’s 45 votes was invalidated, bringing his count to 44.

Annulment and setting aside of the proclamation of Lallave, Jr.
Declaration and proclamation of Marivic Zarate as the duly elected SK Chairman of Brgy. Ican, Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
No pronouncement as to the costs was made.

Dissatisfied with the trial court decision, respondent Julian Lallave, Jr. filed an appeal with the Commission on Elections.
Contentions of the appeal included:

Arguing that the ballots marked with exhibits “A” through “E” bearing the initials “JL” should have been credited in his favor because these initials uniquely identified him.
Claiming that additional ballots (exhibits “F”, “G”, and “H”), though containing variations of his name (e.g., “Julian, Jr. de Real”, “I Notno Lallave”, “Nono de Real”), similarly identified him properly—considering that he is known locally as “Nono” and uses “de Real” (his mother’s surname) as his middle name.

The respondent defended his position by asserting that under paragraph 14, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code, such ballots should be considered valid.

On April 24, 1997, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution in favor of respondent Lallave, Jr.
Key findings of the COMELEC En Banc included:

Holding that the ballots with “JL” initials sufficiently identified the respondent, as he was the only candidate with those initials.
Relying on Section 211, paragraph 14 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that any vote containing initials only, or that is illegible or insufficiently identifying, shall be considered a stray vote but should not invalidate the whole ballot.

Despite the petitioner's arguments, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the validity of the questioned ballots and declared Julian Lallave, Jr. as the duly elected SK Chairman.

The petitioner further raised that the COMELEC En Banc’s action was without jurisdiction because:

Under Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution, and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure—specifically Rule 27 concerning Special Cases—pre-proclamation election controversies must first be heard by a Division of the Commission.
The proper procedure mandates that appeals be first considered by a Division, and only motions for reconsideration are directly addressed by the COMELEC En Banc.

The respondent’s appeal, placed directly before the COMELEC En Banc rather than a Division, was deemed a transgression of these rules.

Whether the ballots marked with the initials “JL” should be considered marked ballots or stray votes.
Whether these ballots sufficiently identify the candidate meant to receive them, given that Julian Lallave, Jr. is the only candidate with such initials in the race.

Whether the COMELEC En Banc properly exercised jurisdiction in hearing and deciding the appeal directly, bypassing the mandatory referral to a Division as required for Special Cases.
Whether proceeding en banc in a first-instance appeal violates constitutional and procedural rules governing election cases.