Case Digest (Adm. Case No. 111)
Facts:
In Suga Sotto y Yuvienco, et al. v. Hon. Auxencio C. Dacuycuy (G.R. No. 55048, May 27, 1981), petitioners Suga Sotto Yuvienco, Britania Sotto, and Marcelino Sotto sought certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy of the CFI of Leyte. They questioned his November 2, 1978 and August 29, 1980 orders in Civil Case No. 5759, which denied their motion to dismiss the specific-performance suit filed by private respondents—Dely Rodriguez, Felipe Ang Cruz, Constancia Nogar, Manuel Go, and others—occupants of the Sotto property in Tacloban City. On July 12, 1978, petitioners’ agent, Atty. Pedro C. Gamboa, offered the land and buildings for ₱6,500,000, granting respondents until July 31 to accept. The occupants replied by telegram, “we agree to buy property … proceed Tacloban to negotiate details.” Atty. Gamboa’s July 27 cable announced his arrival with a draft contract and bank draft. On August 1, 1978, he presented a contract stipulating ₱2,000,000 down and ₱Case Digest (Adm. Case No. 111)
Facts:
- Background and Offer
- On July 12, 1978, petitioners, through their authorized agent Atty. Pedro C. Gamboa, sent a letter to “Yao King Ong & tenants” offering to sell land and building in Tacloban City for ₱6,500,000, giving them a preferential option to decide by July 31, 1978.
- Respondents replied by telegram: “we agree to buy property proceed Tacloban to negotiate details.”
- Negotiation and Alleged Contract
- On July 27, 1978, Gamboa wired respondents: “PROPOSAL ACCEPTED ARRIVING TUESDAY MORNING WITH CONTRACT PREPARE PAYMENT BANK DRAFT.”
- On August 1, 1978, Gamboa arrived in Tacloban with a prepared contract. Respondents refused to sign and returned the bank draft because the draft stipulated a 30-day payment for the ₱4,500,000 balance instead of the 90 days they claimed was agreed.
- Procedural History
- Respondents filed a complaint for specific performance, alleging a perfected contract at ₱6,500,000 with ₱2,000,000 down and ₱4,500,000 within 90 days.
- Petitioners moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds.
- The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the letters and telegrams attached to the complaint constituted a sufficient memorandum under the Statute of Frauds.
- Petitioners elevated the case by certiorari and prohibition to the Supreme Court, challenging the trial court’s orders of November 2, 1978 and August 29, 1980.
Issues:
- Does the complaint state a cause of action for specific performance of a contract of sale?
- Is the alleged contract enforceable under the Statute of Frauds?
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)