G.R. No. 165987 - Alfelor vs. Halasan

Petitioner: Hatima C. Yasin, a Muslim Filipino, filed a petition to resume the use of her maiden name.
Representation: She was represented by her attorney-in-fact, Hadji Hasan S. Centi, under a Special Power of Attorney.
Civil Context: The petitioner is a divorcee whose dissolution of marriage was effected under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD No. 1083).

Date and Venue: On May 5, 1990, the petition was filed with the Sharia District Court in Zamboanga City.
Content of the Petition:

The petition asserted that she is of legal age, a divorcee, and a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City.
It detailed her former marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, including the divorce decree issued on March 13, 1984, by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in conformity with Islamic law.
It emphasized that subsequent to the divorce, her former husband contracted another marriage.
Legal Basis: Citing Article 143, para. 1(c) of PD No. 1083 in relation to Article 371(2) of the New Civil Code, the petitioner prayed for judicial authority to resume her maiden name: Hatima Centi y Saul.

The respondent court observed deficiencies in the petition’s form and substance under Sections 2(a) and 3 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Specific deficiencies noted included the incorrect statement of the petitioner’s residence and an improper indication of the name to be adopted (failure to include all names historically used).
The petition was ordered to be amended within one week.

On August 10, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion arguing that the petition did not fall under Rule 103 since it was not a petition for change of name in the conventional sense but a confirmation to resume a legal right after divorce.
The motion was denied on the ground that the substantive nature of the petition was, in effect, one for change of name, and thus the formal requirements of Rule 103 were applicable.

In a comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court further elaborated that the petition is substantively a change-of-name case because it seeks the resumption of the petitioner’s maiden surname following her divorce and her former husband’s re-marriage.
Citation of Precedents: The court relied on decisions such as Ng Yao Siong, Go, and Pabellar among others to justify its position.

The petitioner’s arguments and the court’s comments referenced provisions in the Civil Code (specifically Articles 370-373 and 376-371) and the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083 and PD 1086).
It was emphasized that while the use of a husband’s surname during marriage is permissive, resuming the maiden name after marriage dissolution is a right inherent in one’s civil status, not a “change” that requires the additional procedure provided under Rule 103.

Whether the petition to resume the use of one’s maiden name – following a divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws – constitutes a petition for change of name subject to the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Whether a divorcee, whose former husband has subsequently contracted another marriage, must comply with the procedural and substantive requisites required for a change of name.

Whether the petitioner’s claim simply to resume her original (maiden) name, as recorded in the Civil Register, falls within the ambit of a judicial process for changing one’s name mandated by Article 376 of the Civil Code.
The broader implications of distinguishing between actual change of name versus the confirmation of a legal right based on a change in civil status (from married to divorced).