G.R. No. 159186 - Yap vs. Cabales

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap, along with his spouse Bessie Yap, conducts a real estate business through the Primetown Property Group.
In 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from Evelyn Te, for which he issued several postdated checks payable through the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
Spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta later rediscounted these checks obtained from Evelyn.

Initially, the first few postdated checks were honored by the bank.
In early 1997, subsequent checks, when deposited, were dishonored due to the stated reason “Account is Closed.”
Demands were made by the furnishers of the rediscounted checks (Spouses Mirabueno and Dimalanta) for payment, but petitioner failed to make good on the amounts represented.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and attorney’s fees with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City (Civil Case No. 6231).
On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta initiated a similar civil action (Civil Case No. 6238).
Concurrently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (pertaining to the issuance of bouncing checks) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in various criminal cases.

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions: one to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question and another to exclude the private prosecutor from the proceedings.
The MTCC denied both the motion to suspend proceedings and the motion to exclude the private prosecutor, as evidenced by its Orders dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000.
Petitioner further pursued a Partial Motion for Reconsideration in several criminal cases and a Motion for Reconsideration regarding the suspension issue in Criminal Case No. 35522-I, which were denied in an Order dated October 18, 2000.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC to challenge the MTCC’s orders, alleging grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed on July 2, 2001.
A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was also denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.
Petitioner elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals (CA) by filing a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with a prayer for a status quo order and writ of preliminary injunction (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250).

The CA, on April 30, 2003, ruled that the civil cases (Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238) involved issues of collection related to rediscounted checks and not the validity of the sale itself.
The CA emphasized that the civil actions and the criminal proceedings for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were separate; the issue in the civil cases did not serve as a necessary precondition for deciding the petitioner’s criminal liability.
On July 17, 2003, the CA denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, affirming its earlier decision.

Petitioner argued that the civil cases raised a prejudicial question since the issues there—especially regarding the lack of valid consideration for the checks—should determine his liability in the criminal cases.
He maintained that if the sale was void or lacked valid consideration, then he could not be held liable for issuing bouncing checks under B.P. Blg. 22.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, contended that the issues resolved in the civil cases had no bearing on the criminal charges because the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 strictly penalizes the act of issuing a worthless check regardless of the civil dispute.

Whether the pending civil cases involving collection of sums of money and damages raise an issue that is intimately related to— and determinative of— the petitioner’s criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Whether the fact that the civil cases question the financial and transactional aspects of the check issuance (such as the presence of valid consideration) constitutes a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the criminal proceedings.

Whether the resolution of the civil actions, which focus on the validity and payment obligations relating to the checks, impacts or precludes the determination of guilt or innocence in the criminal cases.
If abolished, whether the petitioner could argue that the criminal prosecution is contingent on the final resolution of the civil collection issues.

Whether the petitioner’s claim that the order to stop payment (and subsequent account closure) was made to avoid bank penalties—and not necessarily to default—is a legitimate defense in the criminal context.
Whether such a defense should have been raised during trial rather than preemptively to suspend the criminal proceedings.