G.R. No. 996 - Yangco vs. Rohde

Luis R. Yangco, the petitioner, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against Judge William J. Rohde of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The petition arose from a divorce suit filed by Victorina Obin, who claimed to be the lawful wife of Yangco and sought declarations confirming her marital status, a divorce, alimony, and attorney’s fees.

During the divorce proceeding, Yangco’s demurrer was overruled by Judge Rohde.
The judge’s ruling included a statement that although the existence of the marriage was “not clear nor free from doubt,” he resolved the uncertainty in favor of the plaintiff, thereby allowing the filing of a motion for provisional alimony.
On July 22, the judge ordered Yangco to pay a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos, with additional amounts due on a specified date, even though the evidence regarding the marriage remained contested.

Yangco contended that by issuing an interlocutory order granting alimony, Judge Rohde acted in excess of jurisdiction because the legal existence of the marriage had not been conclusively established.
The petitioner argued that he would suffer irreparable financial harm since the plaintiff had no property or security to guarantee recovery of the sums disbursed.
Yangco maintained that no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy existed under the ordinary course of law to correct the alleged jurisdictional error because the interlocutory nature of the order precluded an immediate appeal.

Judge Rohde, on behalf of the respondent, argued that the lower court had proper jurisdiction to try the divorce suit and its incidental issues, including the claim for alimony pendente lite.
The respondent’s legal theory was that although the marriage’s existence was in doubt, the judge’s preliminary determination favored the plaintiff’s right to alimony as an incident to the divorce suit.
It was further asserted that the law provided for alimony under the Civil Code and related procedural rules, and that an interlocutory order by the trial court was appropriate even if it was not eligible for appeal until final judgment.

The decision discussed analogous cases from American jurisprudence—particularly in California—to illustrate that a writ of prohibition is available when a lower tribunal acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The case highlighted that under the former and present Codes of Civil Procedure in the Islands, certain procedural safeguards (such as documental proof of marriage in alimony cases) were required, contrasting with the judge’s ruling in this case.

Whether the trial court, in adjudicating a divorce suit that involved the contested status of a marriage, could validly grant alimony pendente lite.
Whether the ordering of alimony before definitive proof of the existence of a lawful marriage constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction beyond that which the court possesses.

Whether the petitioner had any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law apart from the writ of prohibition.
Whether the absence of an appeal from an interlocutory order necessitated the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent irreparable harm.

Whether the requirement to establish the civil status of marriage conclusively (via documentary evidence and final judgment) is a necessary precondition for granting alimony.
Whether applying such a stringent standard was consistent with both the Civil Code and the then-applicable rules of civil procedure.