G.R. No. 141309 - Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp.

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation manufactures cigarette brands including "Champion," "Hope," and "More."
On June 10, 1993, Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654) was enacted, effective July 3, 1993, revising tax rates on cigarettes. Before RA 7654 took effect, these brands were local and taxed at 20-45%.

On July 1, 1993, two days before RA 7654’s effectivity, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands, subject to a 55% ad valorem tax.
This reclassification subjected those cigarettes to a higher tax rate with a minimum of P5.00 per pack, pursuant to Sec. 142(c)(1) of the National Internal Revenue Code.

On July 2, 1993, BIR Deputy Commissioner sent a copy of RMC 37-93 to respondent via telefax, but without a specific addressee.
On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received a certified xerox copy by ordinary mail.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on July 20, 1993, which was denied by letter dated July 30, 1993.
The letter also assessed Fortune Tobacco for P9,598,334.00 tax deficiency based on RMC 37-93, demanding payment within 10 days.

Respondent petitioned the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on August 3, 1993; on September 30, 1993, an injunction enjoining the circular’s implementation was issued.
On August 10, 1994, CTA declared RMC 37-93 defective, invalid, and unenforceable, and enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax.
The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and later by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.
The Court held RMC 37-93 failed to meet legal requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against petitioner in her private capacity, invoking Article 32 of the Civil Code for violation of constitutional rights (due process and equal protection).
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that:

She acted in official capacity and within authority, so the Republic should be liable, not her personally.
The complaint lacked allegations of malice or bad faith.
The certification against forum shopping was signed by counsel, not by respondent as required.

On September 29, 1997, RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that deciding on the merits prematurely was inappropriate and that the certification defect was cured by a corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing counsel.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, which denied the petition, citing Article 32 of the Civil Code allows liability without malice or bad faith.
Petitioner then filed this instant petition before the Supreme Court contesting:

Applicability of Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code (which requires bad faith, malice, or gross negligence for liability).
Whether the complaint states a cause of action under Article 32 of the Civil Code or should be dismissed for lack of such allegations.
The validity of the certification against forum shopping.

May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of official functions?
Between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, which provision governs the determination of whether the complaint states a cause of action?
Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the certification against forum shopping rule?
May petitioner be held liable for damages for alleged constitutional rights violations?