Case Digest (G.R. No. 14639)
Facts:
Zacarias Villavicencio et al. v. Justo Lukban et al., G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919, the Supreme Court En Banc, Malcolm, J., writing for the Court.
Petitioners were relatives and friends of some 170 women who had for years lived and worked in a segregated district of prostitution in Manila; respondents included Justo Lukban, Mayor of the City of Manila, Anton Hohmann, Chief of Police of Manila, Francisco Sales, Provincial Governor of Davao, and Feliciano Ynigo, a hacendero of Davao, among others. The dispute arose from the Mayor’s initiative to close the segregated district; between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the police confined the women to their houses and, on the night of October 25, pursuant to orders from the Mayor and Chief of Police, hustled approximately 170 inmates into patrol wagons and placed them aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros, which then carried them to Davao without giving them opportunity to collect belongings or to consent to the transfer.
The steamers arrived at Davao on October 29, 1918; the women were landed and “receipted for as laborers” by Governor Sales and by Ynigo. Some of the women later married, worked, disappeared, or returned to Manila; others remained in Davao. Petitioners’ attorney filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus before a member of the Supreme Court; by stipulation the application was made to include all the deported women and the writ was ordered returnable before the full Court. The city fiscal appeared for respondents, admitted certain facts, and opposed issuance on grounds including improper parties, improper venue (that the remedy should have been sought in the Court of First Instance of Davao), lack of custody by the Manila officials, and lack of jurisdiction outside Manila.
On November 4, 1918 the Supreme Court awarded the writ and directed Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Ynigo to produce the persons named on December 2, 1918. By December 2 seven women had returned on their own and testified before a commissioner; respondents did not produce the others and filed returns asserting the women were at liberty in Davao, had signed labor contracts, or had waived the right to return by affidavit. On December 10 the Court issued a second order directing production on January 13, 1919 unless the women filed written renunciations before the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao or respondents showed other legal excuses.
Further testimony was taken before commissioners in Manila and Davao. On January 13 respondents produced the seven who had returned on their own and eight others they had brought back; they also claimed that 81 women in Davao had renounced the right to return by sworn statements, 59 had already returned by other means, and 26 could not be located. Petitioners moved to hold a number of respondents — including Mayor Lukban, Chief Hohmann, certain policemen, the Bureau of Labor attorney, Ynigo, and the Manila fiscal — in contempt. The City Fiscal moved to strike petitioners’ reply memorandum.
In its decision the Court (Malcolm, J.) reviewed whether habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy and whether the writ was properly issued and made returnable before the Supreme Court; it examined whether the women were under restraint despite their being in Davao, whether respondents had complied with the writs, and whether contempt should be found and punished. The Court concluded the deportation was unlawful, that habeas corpus was the proper and speedy remedy, that the Supreme Court could properly entertain the writ returnable before it, that the restraint began in Manila and continued in Davao, and that although respondents’ initial compliance was deficient the second order elicited substantial compliance. The Court found Mayor Lukban in contempt and imposed a nominal fine of P100; the other named respondents were found not in contempt, the fiscal’s motion to strike was granted, and costs were taxed against respondents. There were two separate o...(Subscriber-Only)
Issues:
- Did petitioners have legal standing and was the Supreme Court authorized to issue and entertain a writ of habeas corpus returnable before it in this case?
- Were the deported women legally restrained of their liberty by the respondents such that the writ of habeas corpus could reach and command their production even though they had been transported to Davao?
- Did respondents comply with the Court’s writs and, if not, were they in contempt and what sanction was proper?
- Had the Mayor and Chief of Police lawful authority to depo...(Subscriber-Only)
Ruling:
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Ratio:
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Doctrine:
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