G.R. No. 232202 - Villareal, Jr. vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

In a Decision dated October 30, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 39, dismissed the case “Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Orlando A. Villareal and other persons claiming Rights Under Him” (Civil Case No. 21293) for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.
On appeal by the respondent MWSS, the RTC-Branch 96 rendered a Decision on September 27, 2002 in Civil Case Nos. Q-01-42773 and Q-01-42773-B, reversing the MeTC’s dismissal.
The RTC ordered Orlando and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation, with an Entry of Judgment/Order issued on December 15, 2002, thereby rendering the decision final and executory.

MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution on May 17, 2004 with the MeTC, acting within the five-year period from the date the judgment became final (December 15, 2002).
Orlando (represented by Daniel A. Villareal, Jr.) filed his Comment/Opposition on July 2, 2004, arguing that compliance with Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7279 (the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) should have been observed, as that Act benefits underprivileged and homeless citizens—a benefit he claimed he was entitled to.

More than ten years after MWSS’s initial filing for execution, the MeTC issued an Order on July 28, 2014, granting the motion for issuance of the writ despite Orlando’s comment/opposition.
On October 26, 2015, after the prolonged delay, the MeTC actually issued the Writ of Execution to enforce the RTC decision, followed by the sheriff sending a Notice to Vacate and Pay on April 19, 2016.

On April 20, 2016, Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. (on behalf of Orlando) filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with RTC-Branch 215 challenging both the issued Writ of Execution (October 26, 2015) and the subsequent Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay.
The petitioner contended that:

The execution was effected more than ten years after the judgment entry, thereby violating the five-year prescriptive period prescribed in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The delay in the issuance of the writ, even if the motion was filed within the period, nullified the execution because both the filing of the motion and the actual issuance of the writ must occur within five years.

The five-year period runs solely against the judgment creditor in its enforcement efforts and does not bind the court in issuing the writ.
Orlando’s filing of a Comment/Opposition contributed to the delay in the execution process.

Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition by erroneously applying Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court regarding the issuance of the writ of execution.

Whether the requirement that both the filing of the motion and the issuing of the writ occur within five years from the judgment’s entry was properly observed.
Whether MWSS’s contention—that the delay in execution was attributable to Orlando’s filing of a Comment/Opposition—constitutes a valid exception to the rule on the five-year prescriptive period.