G.R. No. 188146 - Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. Royal Ferry Services, Inc.

Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a seasoned lawyer with experience as a Justice of the Peace, member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, law professor, and sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, originally represented petitioner Exequiel Victorio in various civil cases from 1953 until 1963.
In 1963, petitioner Exequiel Victorio replaced Atty. Ruiz with Atty. L. Castillo, who then assumed legal representation along with Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Following the change in counsel, Exequiel Victorio and his wife initiated an administrative charge against Judge Guiang, a case which was investigated by Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, while disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz were concurrently pending in the Office of the Solicitor General.

On January 9, 1964, during the hearing of the administrative case in Judge Avancena’s sala, Atty. Castillo moved to disqualify Judge Avancena from hearing the case.
In response, Judge Avancena admonished Atty. Castillo and Atty. Ruiz, representing respondent Judge Guiang, moved to cite Atty. Castillo for contempt of court.
Later that same day, while petitioners Daniel and Exequiel Victorio were leaving the sala via the corridor and stairs, an incident occurred which gave rise to the criminal prosecution for oral defamation.
Policeman Emiliano Manuzon of Cabanatuan City, a witness for the prosecution, overheard the following defamatory utterances:

Daniel Victorio stated: “Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang at estapador.”
Exequiel Victorio echoed similarly inflammatory remarks in a mixture of languages, equivalent in meaning to accusing Atty. Ruiz of dishonesty and impropriety.

On February 8, 1964, both Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio were charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan City with Serious Oral Defamation based on identical informations describing the uttered defamatory words aimed to discredit Atty. Vivencio Ruiz.
The information specifically noted that the words were uttered “willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously” and in the presence of many persons, intended to place Ruiz in public ridicule and contempt.
Both accused pleaded not guilty at arraignment and their cases were tried jointly.
On April 10, 1968, the City Court rendered its decision finding both accused guilty of Grave Oral Defamation.

Exequiel Victorio was sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of imprisonment.
Daniel Victorio received an identical sentence and was additionally ordered to pay costs proportionately.

A subsequent motion for reconsideration/modification of judgment filed on April 10, 1968, was denied by the trial court on September 25, 1968.

On October 9, 1968, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence:

Motions for rehearing/reconsideration filed on October 15 and October 19, 1970, were denied by the Court of Appeals on October 28, 1970.
A petition for review by certiorari was subsequently filed on December 18, 1970.
Further proceedings:

On February 11, 1971, the petition was initially denied for insufficient showing that the factual findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.
On April 15, 1971, reconsideration was granted on the grounds submitted, and the petition for review was given due course.

On October 15, 1974, counsel for petitioners filed a motion to dismiss certain criminal cases, manifesting that petitioner-appellant Exequiel Victorio had died on April 14, 1974.

There being no objection from the Solicitor General, on December 18, 1974, the Court dismissed the part of the case concerning the deceased petitioner, Exequiel Victorio.

Counsel for petitioners narrowed the error to a single point: that the Court of Appeals erred in treating the defamatory words uttered in anger as grave oral defamation instead of slight oral defamation.
Implicitly, this argument acknowledged that the accused had committed the offense charged, but contended it should be characterized as slight due to the context of anger.

The defamatory words were uttered against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a prominent lawyer known for his professional accomplishments.
The imputations included terms like “estapador,” which alleged serious crimes (specifically, estafa) and carried an inherently insulting nature.
The uttered words were made in a public setting:

The improper remarks amounted to an imputation that could damage Ruiz’s reputation and professional standing irreparably.

Whether the uttered defamatory words constitute grave (serious) oral defamation or merely slight oral defamation.

The central question is based on the qualification of the offense: the distinction primarily hinges on the language used and the context in which it was delivered.
The petitioner argued that the words, being spoken in the heat of anger, should amount only to slight oral defamation.
The respondent and the lower courts maintained that the nature of the imputation—specifically, accusing a respected lawyer of corruption and dishonesty—elevates the offense to grave oral defamation.

Whether the presence of multiple witnesses and the public setting affect the gravity of the defamation.
Whether the particular use of terms that impute a crime (estafa) against a lawyer—whose professional reputation is paramount—has an automatic effect on the severity of the offense.

The issue also involves interpreting the distinctions set forth in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code regarding defamation.
The court had to determine whether prior decisions, particularly those referred to by the petitioner involving angry utterances, are binding or applicable in the present case.