G.R. No. 12190 - Velasco vs. Judge, Court of 1st Instance of the Province of Pangasi

On June 6, 1916, an election was held in the municipality of Asingan for the purpose of electing a president and other municipal officers.
On June 10, 1916, the municipal board of inspectors proclaimed Hermenegildo Velasco as having been duly elected as president of the municipality.
The certificate of election detailed the vote counts for the office of president, listing multiple candidates including Hermenegildo Velasco (624 votes) and Moises Malong (582 votes), among others, with several candidates receiving a single vote.

On June 20, 1916, Moises Malong filed a protest in the Court of First Instance alleging that fraud had been committed during the election, sufficient to question the propriety of Velasco’s election.
A copy of the protest was delivered to all persons who had received votes for the office of president, including Velasco.
The protest detailed allegations concerning the irregularities in the conduct of the election and the process of notification.

On August 17, 1916, Hermenegildo Velasco, as protestee in the appeal of the election, filed a motion in the Court of First Instance praying that the protest be dismissed.

The motion alleged that neither Velasco nor Zacarias Cardinez was properly notified of the protest as required by law.
It further asserted that they had received only a copy of the protest without any accompanying notification setting the date and place for hearing.

On August 22, 1916, Judge Julio Llorente denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that:

Notification had been given in compliance with the applicable law.
There is no special form of notification required for an election protest, and the copies delivered sufficed as notice.

Following the lower court's decision, Velasco petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to stop the lower court from continuing the hearing on the merits of the protest.

The petition for the writ of prohibition was presented in the Supreme Court, and the respondents were ordered to show cause why the petition should not be granted.
On October 18, 1916, the respondents answered the petition, admitting several facts but denying that the method of notification was deficient.
The respondents’ answer included a series of defenses:

They noted that copies of the protest had been furnished to the relevant parties on specified dates.
They argued that a protest is not an ordinary complaint and does not require service of summons.
They contended that no statutory provision mandates a particular form of notice for election protests.
They emphasized that Velasco, by answering the protest, had effectively consented to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

The case involved an examination of sections 576 and 578 of the Administrative Code (and their corresponding amendments) concerning the filing and notice requirements for election contests.
Precedents from cases such as Whitney vs. Blackburn and other cited decisions were used to determine that the notice delivered (containing requisite information such as the name of the court, parties, and demand for relief) was legally sufficient.

Justice Moreland concurred with the result, emphasizing that the steps in contested election cases should be modeled after ordinary actions.
He highlighted that although the statute is silent on the service of the pleading, the substance of effective notice was met if it informed the respondents of the case’s essentials to allow them to prepare their defense.

Whether the manner in which the protest was notified to the candidates satisfied the statutory and procedural requirements under the Administrative Code.

Did the delivery of a copy of the protest constitute adequate notice to the protestees?
Is a formal or specially prescribed notice required for contesting an election when the statute is silent on the format of such notice?

Whether the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan had the jurisdiction to continue hearing and deciding on the election contest given the alleged deficiencies in notification.

Does the lack of a formal summons or notification invalidate the jurisdiction of the lower court over the election contest?

Whether the petition for a writ of prohibition was a proper remedy to challenge the continuation of proceedings by the court, based on the protestee’s contention regarding notice.