G.R. No. L-658 - Vda. de Mendoza vs. Palacio

On August 21, 1946, the appellee, Gabriela Vda. de Mendoza (plaintiff and appellee), filed a motion for the execution of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila on January 22, 1946.
The execution was sought to oust the defendant/appellant, Gregorio Palacio, from the premises due to his failure to pay or deposit the current monthly rent.

The underlying issue concerned the non-payment/deposit of the P25 rent for July by the appellant, with the deadline being August 10, 1946.
The appellant admitted his failure to timely pay but contended:

He had already filed an appeal bond amounting to P60, and further deposited a supersedeas bond in the amount of P80 (covering four months’ rental payments) with the clerk of the Court of First Instance on October 6, 1945.
The appellant argued that this supersedeas bond should be sufficient and that Section 9 of Rule 72 does not require the monthly rentals to be paid or deposited within the first ten days of the calendar month.

Section 8 of Rule 72 mandates the defendant, upon a perfected appeal, to pay or deposit:

Rents, damages, and costs up to the time of the final judgment.
The rental amount “on or before the tenth day of each calendar month” for the preceding month, or as determined by contract if one exists.

Section 9 of Rule 72 provides that execution of the judgment shall not be stayed unless the appellant pays the same amounts as described in Section 8, either to the plaintiff or into the appellate court.
The case also references prior jurisprudence, notably Mitschiener vs. Barrios, in clarifying the purpose and effect of the supersedeas bond.

The appellant contended that the deposition of the supersedeas bond in the amount of P80 should relieve him from the obligation to deposit current rents during the pendency of the appeal.
Moreover, the appellant argued that Section 9 did not specify a particular deadline for the monthly rent deposits, thus implying that the strict payment schedule of the Court of First Instance might not apply in the appellate context.
The appellee, however, maintained that the supersedeas bond is intended only to secure the payment of arrears and not to substitute for the ongoing obligation to pay current rents.

Whether the supersedeas bond deposited by the appellant, amounting to P80 (covering four months’ rent), suffices to substitute for the obligation of paying or depositing the current monthly rental payments during the pendency of the appeal.

Whether Section 9 of Rule 72, read in conjunction with Section 8, mandates that current rents be deposited within the prescribed time (on or before the tenth day of each calendar month) similar to the procedure applicable in cases pending appeal from the Court of First Instance.

The proper interpretation of the language of Section 9 of Rule 72, specifically the operative phrase “in the same manner as therein provided,” and whether it qualifies both the amount to be deposited and the timing of the deposit.

Whether the existence of a contract of lease between the parties should influence the time for the payment or deposit of the rents during the pendency of the appeal.