G.R. No. L-31985 - Vda. de Catchuela vs. Francisco

A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner Irene Vda. de Catchuela in June 1970 challenging the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch IX.
The petition sought relief on several grounds: the dismissal of her complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance of the property, errors in the trial court’s findings regarding her rights over the lot, and issues regarding the proper inclusion of respondent courts in the answers filed by respondents.
A resolution dated June 16, 1970, by the court mandated that the petition for review on certiorari be given due course, thereby addressing the dismissal of the Court of First Instance’s decision.

Concurrent with or as an incidental issue, a complaint for ejectment was filed by respondent Adalia Francisco in the City Court of Quezon City (Civil Case No. III-13818) seeking to eject petitioner from Lot 9, Block E-148 of the East Avenue Subdivision.
The complaint alleged “unlawful entry” by the petitioner, who was reported to have taken possession of the lot to build her house, and emphasized that such entry was characterized only by “stealth and strategy”—a mere recitation of the legal language in the Rules of Court without substantially qualifying the act.
The conspicuous location of the lot (situated along E. de los Santos Avenue with visibility from the Botocan Lines along Kamias Street, near the old City Hall) rendered any allegation of clandestine entry implausible.
The timeline indicated that the petitioner had been in open possession of the lot from “prior to October 14, 1965” up to the time the ejectment suit was initiated, thus making it unreasonable to allege surreptitious behavior.

The lot was originally applied for by Mariano Diaz with the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) on January 28, 1957, and was awarded to him in good faith as a bona fide applicant.
The petitioner challenged the award by filing a motion for reconsideration with the PHHC’s Administrative Investigation Committee, which was ultimately denied.
After the completion of the necessary payments, a deed of sale was executed in favor of Mariano Diaz, and subsequently, a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 86426) was issued on December 11, 1964.
Later, Mariano Diaz sold the lot to respondent Adalia Francisco, in whose name a new title (TCT No. 86593) was issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

After acquiring the lot, respondent Adalia Francisco made verbal and later written demands (notably on November 2, 1965) for the petitioner to vacate the premises.
The petitioner, who had built her house on the lot, was later subjected to an ejectment action by Adalia Francisco.
In November 1968, while the ejectment case was pending, petitioner filed a special civil action in the Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. Q-11636) seeking cancellation of title and/or reconveyance of the property, along with a preliminary injunction and other reliefs.
Respondents contended that the petitioner, being a mere squatter who had occupied the land by mere tolerance (without any formal or consensual acquisition of rights), had no cause of action since she possessed no legal right over the lot.

The trial court ruled that the petitioner’s complaint failed to state a cause of action on several grounds, including the absence of any legal right that had been violated by the respondents.
The court noted that, having been merely tolerated as an occupant without any legitimate title or contractual relation, the petitioner had no claim to preferential rights over the lot.
The decision referenced earlier cases and established that occupation by tolerance does not equate to acquisition of any legal property right, thereby justifying the dismissal of the complaint.

Whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the petitioner’s special civil action for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance of the property.

The petitioner alleged that her long possession and the factual circumstances warranted recognition of a legal right over the lot.
The error asserted also encompassed the trial court’s finding that no violation of any legal right had occurred.

Whether the petitioner’s claim that the City Court of Quezon City lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment case due to her open and longstanding possession was tenable.

The petitioner contended that her continuous possession for more than one year prior to the filing of the ejectment action should have barred such proceedings in the City Court and mandated the proper filing in the Court of First Instance.

Whether the respondent courts, including the City Court and the Court of First Instance, should have been treated collectively in respondents’ answers.

The petitioner asserted that the answers of the respondents should have included all pertinent respondent courts, thereby affecting the resolution of the jurisdictional issue.

Whether the description of the petitioner’s act of “unlawful entry” (using the terms “stealth and strategy”) was a mere recitation of legal verbiage without substantive factual basis, thus insufficient to establish a cause of action for ejectment.

Whether the established jurisprudence on occupancy and possession—specifically the principle that mere tolerance does not create a legal right—was correctly applied by the lower courts in dismissing the petitioner’s claims.