G.R. No. 173268 - Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman

Petitioners: Apolinario Valdez, Amanda Espiritu, Aquilina Hernandez, Salvador Petines, together with Arcadia, Angel, Luis, and Lina Gaddi (represented by their heirs and/or successors-in-interest).
Respondents: Heirs of Antero Catabas.

The petition for review on certiorari challenges the April 19, 2011 Decision and the March 30, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA rendered its decision denying the petition for review for lack of merit, and this decision had earlier affirmed the administrative rulings of the Office of the President (OP) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Subsequent filings include a motion for reconsideration by petitioners which was denied both administratively and by the appellate court.

On September 8, 1949, Antero Catabas filed Free Patent Application (FPA) No. V-8500 for Lot No. 4967, later amended on September 15, 1952, to cover only Lot No. 4967-C.
Originally, Lot No. 4967 was subdivided pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 (November 7, 1931) into three lots, with Lots 4967-A and 4967-B reserved for public purposes, and Lot No. 4967-C later subjected to further subdivision due to Cadastral Subdivision Survey No. 167 under Proclamation No. 247 (January 19, 1956).
The administrative process included posting notices of the free patent application as directed by the Director of Lands, following a recommendation for its approval by Assistant Public Land Inspector Tomas Cruz.

Petitioners (and other claimants) later filed sales patent applications covering various lots derived from the original Lot No. 4967-C.
Specific lot designations include numbers such as 316, 317, 500, 501-B, 498, 502, and 505 for one group and 315, 318, 501, 499, 506, 507, 510, and 511 for another grouping.
Their claims arose after Antero’s original possession dating back to 1929, as evidenced by early tax declarations and continuous real estate tax payments.

The respondents (heirs of Antero) filed a protest against the sales patent applications and related claims, arguing that Antero’s free patent application conferred a vested right.
They presented evidence of his early occupancy (since 1929) and tax payments as proof of continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession.
They relied on prior case law, including the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela v. Court of Appeals, to bolster the claim that Antero’s timely filing of an answer during the cadastral proceedings strengthened his claim.

Land Investigator Luis V. Salatan, Sr. recommended dismissing respondents’ protests on the grounds that Antero did not formally oppose the exclusion of a portion of his land and failed to protect his claim during the survey.
The Regional Executive Director (RED) of DENR Region II, however, gave due course to the protest, finding the issuance of petitioners’ sales patents premature, illegal, and marked by bad faith.
The OP later affirmed this stance in the May 18, 1998 Decision, confirming that Antero’s FPA had met all requirements and that he had acquired vested rights over the property.

Petitioners contended that Antero waived his rights by not formally objecting to the inclusion or exclusion of his property during the effectuation of Proclamation No. 247.
They also argued that the continuous processing of his free patent application, which was never formally approved by the Bureau of Lands, did not amount to a vested right.
In contrast, respondents maintained that the continuous administrative actions—posting notices, recommendations for approval, and his longstanding possession—substantiated his claim.

Which party holds a superior right to the disputed lots: the petitioners (through later sales patent applications) or the respondents (through Antero’s earlier free patent application)?
Does Antero’s free patent application, filed in 1949 and later amended, confer a vested right despite the land initially being part of a public domain subject to later alienability declarations?

Whether the failure of Antero to formally oppose the exclusion under Proclamation No. 247 constitutes a waiver of his rights.
Whether his continuous possession and tax payments (dating from 1929) sufficiently evidence his claim to vested rights over Lot No. 4967-C.

The proper interpretation and application of Act No. 2874 and Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 (as amended), particularly Section 44, in determining the rights conferred by a free patent application.
The relevance and application of earlier cases (e.g., Municipality of Santiago, Isabela v. CA, Balboa, and Quinsay) to the determination of vested rights in the context of public land disposition.

Whether petitioners’ claim to indefeasible title after the lapse of one year from the entry of the decree of registration holds any merit given the prior pending free patent application.