Case Digest (G.R. No. L-3830)
Case Digest (G.R. No. L-3830)
Facts:
Urban Estates, Inc. v. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, and the City of Manila, G.R. No. L-3830, March 15, 1951, the Supreme Court En Banc, Tuason, J., writing for the Court.
This appeal arose from an order of Judge Agustin P. Montesa of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Urban Estates, Inc. in an action instituted by the City of Manila to expropriate a tract of land of about 49,553.10 square meters. In the trial court Urban Estates filed a motion to dismiss (in lieu of an answer) under Rule 69, Sec. 4, Rules of Court, asserting defenses and objections to the City's right to take the property and offering to prove specific facts in support.
In its motion the defendant alleged (and tendered documentary support) that the true market value of the property was P1,002,074 (assessed at P363,150); that the land was encumbered by mortgages and bank overdrafts aggregating at least P620,530; that the tract had been laid out and improved as a subdivision, with about one-half of the lots already sold (some fully paid, some on down payment); and that a large portion was reserved for playground under an approved plan (psd-24832). The trial court, however, refused to receive evidence in support of the motion on the ground that a motion to dismiss assumes the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and thus was not the proper vehicle for controverting factual allegations.
On appeal the Supreme Court considered the parties' positions and the documentary character of the defendant's proffered proof. The Court reviewed prior jurisprudence touching on governmental power to expropriate urban lands for subdivision or resale — notably Guido v. Rural Progress Administration (84 Phil. 847), De Borja v. Commonwealth (85 Phil. 51), and Arellano Law Colleges v. City of Manila (85 Phil. 663) — and the controlling principle that the taking must be for a public character or public use (citing the City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, and the constitutional provision identified as Section 4, Article XIII).
Finding that the City vigorously objected to the reception of proof and that the defendant’s claims rested largely on documentary evidence, the Court accepted those factual allegations as true for purposes of decision rather than remanding for further proceedings. Applying the constitutional standard and the cited precedents, the Court concluded the proposed taking did not bear the requisite public character: the land had already been subdivided and was being offered for sale by the owner; the asserted beneficiaries appeared to be a limited class (purchasers unable to meet the seller’s price), and the expropriation would effectively operate as a mechanism to reduce lot prices — an improper use of eminent domain. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order and dismissed the City's action with costs.
Issues:
- Did the trial court err in refusing to receive evidence offered by defendant in support of its motion to dismiss presented under Rule 69, Section 4 of the Rules of Court?
- Was the proposed expropriation by the City of Manila of the subject tract a valid exercise of eminent domain — i.e., a taking for public use or public character under Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution and controlling precedents?
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)