G.R. No. 188818 - Osmena vs. Commission on Audit

The case, reported in 37 Phil. 577 [G.R. No. 11259, February 08, 1918], involves the United States as plaintiff/appellee and Inocencio Rubal as defendant/appellant.
Rubal was charged with the crime of estafa following a preliminary examination by the assistant prosecuting attorney of Manila, who had also charged Arturo Conde.
Conde, being a fugitive from justice, was never tried, while Rubal underwent trial.

An acquittal of Rubal on the estafa charge.
The inclusion in the judgment of an order that would require the prosecution of Heacock Co. for its false and slanderous charges.

The trial court acquitted Rubal but did not declare the accusation false nor did it issue an order for the prosecution of Heacock Co., effectively leaving the false accusation unaddressed in the judgment.
In the short decision of Judge Campbell, it was noted that because the case against Conde was still pending, the evidence (including telegrams sent by the defendants) was considered sufficient to explain the proceedings, thereby justifying the filing of the complaint.

Rubal, dissenting from the trial court's decision, appealed the judgment.
The initial attorney de oficio appointed to represent Rubal found insufficient grounds for appeal and sought to be relieved, with a subsequent de oficio attorney doing the same.
A third attorney de oficio was then designated, who argued that the trial court had erred by not declaring the charges against Rubal as false and slanderous and by neglecting to order the prosecution of the accuser (Clyde W. Chambers) under Article 326 of the Penal Code.
Counsel additionally reserved for Rubal a right to raise a civil action for damages against Chambers and H. E. Heacock Co., asserting that the wrongful prosecution had caused him harm.

The case involved an analysis of Article 326 of the Penal Code, which pertains to the crime of false accusation or complaint.
It was explained that the crime entails falsely charging a person with an offense and, importantly, initiating a prosecution without probable cause and with malice.
The evidence largely comprised telegrams from Rubal and Conde, which instigated the prosecution in the first place.
Although Chambers presented information to the authorities regarding Rubal's actions, there was no evidence suggesting that he misrepresented facts or acted maliciously.
Service by publication was effected since Chambers could not be located in the Philippine Islands, and the attorneys representing H. E. Heacock Co. also filed briefs, aligning partly with the appellant’s stance on false accusation yet contending that the jurisdiction in ordering prosecution lay solely with the trial court.

The decision discussed how the crime of false accusation under Philippine law is practically identical to the crime of malicious prosecution in Anglo-American jurisprudence.
The elements of false accusation were laid out: (a) the existence of a false charge; (b) the necessity of proving that the accuser knew the charge was false; (c) the initiation of a suit without probable cause; and (d) the presence of malice.
References were made to various decisions and legal precedents, both local and foreign, to support this interpretation and the requirements for sustaining a charge of malicious prosecution.

Failing to declare the complaint against Rubal as false and slanderous.
Neglecting to order the prosecution of Clyde W. Chambers for the crime of false accusation under Article 326 of the Penal Code.

Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to remedy the omission by ordering the prosecution of the accuser or if that determination is strictly the prerogative of the trial court.

Whether sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that Chambers acted with malice and without probable cause, thereby justifying a re-prosecution for false accusation despite Rubal’s acquittal.