G.R. No. 183505 - Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.

On or about the 3rd of April, 1907, in the pueblo of Polo, Province of Bulacan, Philippine Islands, the defendant, Juan Garcia, was charged with the crime of allanamiento de morada (forcible entry of a dwelling).
The specific allegation stated that Garcia fraudulently and criminally entered the house of Manuel Villariba against the latter's will and in contravention of the law.

Following the filing of the complaint, Garcia was duly arrested and tried by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
The trial resulted in a conviction; Garcia was found guilty and sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor, a fine of 325 pesetas, and subsidiary imprisonment in the event of insolvency, along with the payment of costs.

The record showed that, on the night in question, Garcia entered the house of Manuel Villariba without the owner’s permission, which prima facie satisfied the allegation for allanamiento de morada.
However, the evidence also revealed that Garcia’s entry was at the express invitation of Marciana Villariba, who was residing in the same dwelling with Manuel Villariba.
The fact that Marciana not only invited Garcia but also assisted his entry became a critical point in evaluating whether the entry truly occurred against the will of the owner.

The decision referenced the case of U. S. vs. Agas (4 Phil. Rep., 129), which established that an entry into a dwelling at the request of one of its occupants does not constitute the crime of allanamiento de morada.
Additional supporting jurisprudence from the supreme court of Spain, with decisions dated 28th June 1876, 28th September 1876, and 18th April 1888, reinforced this interpretation regarding the necessity of non-consent for the crime to be committed.

Whether the fact that Juan Garcia entered the dwelling at the request of Marciana Villariba (an occupant) negates the essential element of non-consent required to constitute the crime of allanamiento de morada.
Whether the lower court’s presumption of forcible entry without adequately addressing the evidence of invitation and assistance provided by an occupant is sufficient to sustain the conviction and sentence.