A.M. No. 20-08-05-SC - Re: Francisco T. Duque III

Venancio de Guzman, accompanied by Pedro and Serapio Macarling, and in the presence of Rufino Garin (deceased), was involved in the killing of Garin.
On the day and at the place specified in the information, De Guzman struck Rufino Garin on the head, knocked him down, and held him on the ground while Pedro Macarling stabbed him to death.
The multiple confessions and corroborative testimonies of witnesses left no doubt regarding the act committed.

Before the trial, an information was filed charging De Guzman jointly with the Macarling brothers with the murder of Garin.
De Guzman entered into an agreement with the fiscal (prosecution) whereby:

He promised to appear at and testify in the trial of his coaccused.
His testimony was to be truthful and comprehensive regarding the events.
In exchange for his reliability as a witness, the foregoing information was to be dismissed against him so that he would not be tried.

With the court’s consent and in pursuance of the agreement, De Guzman was not arraigned or tried in the initial proceeding and was discharged as to that particular charge.

After several witnesses were called in the trial of the remaining coaccused, De Guzman was summoned to the stand.

He denied any knowledge of the murder.
He expressly disclaimed any prior statements that might have implicated his coaccused.

De Guzman swore that a previous statement made before a justice of the peace was false and had been given under the influence of fear of police officers.
During questioning, it was also revealed that he had made another statement implicating his coaccused to a certain Natnat, which he similarly retracted by alleging it was made out of fear.
In essence, De Guzman repudiated all his earlier statements that supported the plea agreement with the prosecution.

The Solicitor-General, invoking sections 34, 35, and 36 of General Orders No. 58, argued that:

A discharge granted to be used as a witness in a multiple-accused charge constitutes an acquittal.
That acquittal serves as a bar against any future prosecution for the same offense.

De Guzman failed to honor his agreement by subsequently testifying falsely.
His fraudulent reversal of his earlier statements negated the protective effect of his prior dismissal.

The trial court, relying on the record and the confirmed misconduct of the accused, permitted the re-prosecution and ultimately convicted him of murder.

The record evidenced that there was a separate plea in bar based on his prior discharge in case No. 3983.
Both the trial court and appellate briefs discussed the sufficiency of evidence regarding:

Whether the accused actually committed fraud in procuring his former release.
Whether that fraudulent conduct could legally nullify the immunity provided by sections 34, 35, and 36.

Various dicta and references to American and English precedents were cited in an effort to interpret the statutory provision and examine the admissibility of evidence related to fraud.

Whether the prior discharge secured by De Guzman, under an arrangement for him to testify as a government witness, constitutes an acquittal and hence a bar against subsequent prosecution.
Whether De Guzman’s later recantation and denial during trial, contradicting his earlier statements, amounts to fraudulent conduct that invalidates the plea agreement and statutory protection.
Whether the government was entitled to invoke sections 34, 35, and 36 of General Orders No. 58 to overcome the plea in bar, given that the allegations of fraud were not raised or substantiated during the trial.
Whether the evidence on record, including the incomplete record regarding the previous charge (case No. 3983), is sufficient to affirm the conviction despite the notice and procedural issues regarding extra-record evidence of fraud.