G.R. No. 192076 - Tuason vs. Bank of Commerce

Petitioner Michelle T. Tuason was hired by respondent Bank of Commerce (BOC) on January 1, 2002, to head the Marketing Department of its Property Management Group (PMG) with the rank of Assistant Vice President.
On May 2, 2002, she was designated officer-in-charge of the entire PMG, and on January 2, 2003, she was officially appointed as PMG head.
Her primary duties included developing and recommending ways to dispose of BOC’s real and acquired properties and assets (ROPOA) in a prompt, cost-effective manner while obtaining the best possible price.

On February 28, 2005, Tuason encountered problems when she was administratively charged with irregularities in the sale of ROPOA properties to Ana Liza Cuizon.
On September 9, 2005, a BOC committee on Fraud, Shortages, and Overages found her in violation of the Code of Discipline on Work Performance and imposed a 30-day suspension.
In 2006, despite the earlier infraction, she was given a sixty-three percent (63%) overall performance rating.

On July 5, 2007, Tuason sent a letter to her sector head, Mario Padilla, in which she:

Mentioned a prior phone call in which Padilla requested her resignation without providing reasons.
Expressed her satisfaction with her work but revealed stress and discomfort regarding the situation.
Requested a leave of absence – July 6–17, 2007 as paid vacation leave, and July 18–August 17, 2007 as leave without pay.

On July 6, 2007, Susan R. Alcala-Uranza, head of BOC’s Human Resources Management and Development Group (HRMDG), informed Tuason that her leave request was disapproved and directed her to report to EVP Arturo Manuel.
A follow-up letter on July 13, 2007 reiterated the directive to report to work, this time specifying that she should report to Padilla.

She had reported to the office on July 9, 2007 and met with both Uranza and Manuel with discussions hinting at a graceful exit.
She received a second return-to-work order for July 16, 2007.
A BOC-wide flyer announced a new PMG head, intensifying her stress and anxiety.

Inquiring about her employment status since she appeared to have been relieved of her position by the appointment of another individual.
Expressing her desire to continue her leave while awaiting clarification from BOC.

On July 26, 2007, Uranza communicated that Tuason’s leave from July 6 to August 17, 2007 was approved, but she was required to report to Padilla on August 20, 2007 for discussion about a new assignment.

On August 23, 2007, after Tuason failed to report for work, Uranza sent a letter warning that her non-reporting might be considered a loss of interest in employment.
On August 24, 2007, Tuason replied, stating confusion over the conflicting letters from BOC and indicated that she had filed a case for constructive dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) initially dismissed her complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s dismissal, finding that Tuason was constructively dismissed, and awarded her separation pay and full backwages.
BOC, unsatisfied with the NLRC decision, sought reconsideration; subsequently, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the NLRC decision by ruling that:

The reassignment of Tuason was a valid exercise of management prerogative.
There was no evidence that she had been asked to resign, and she had adamantly refused a new assignment in the Business Segment.

Tuason petitioned for review on certiorari, challenging whether the pressure to resign and the subsequent transfer/reassignment constituted constructive dismissal.
The Supreme Court found that:

Evidence, including an undoubted memo from Tuason on July 5, 2007, demonstrated that BOC (through Padilla) had been pressuring her to resign.
The replacement of Tuason as head of PMG by hiring Maximo V. Estrada on July 16, 2007—while she was on leave—amounted to a definitive act of constructive dismissal.
Although transfers fall within management prerogative, such authority must be exercised fairly and without abuse of discretion.

Whether the actions and communications of BOC, particularly the repeated directives and the eventual replacement of Tuason by Estrada, effectively amounted to a constructive dismissal.

Did the pressure exerted on Tuason to resign without any valid explanation constitute an abuse of management prerogative?
Is the belated transfer/reassignment, which stripped her of her original position without a proper alternative, tantamount to a dismissal, albeit disguised as a transfer?
Can the inconsistent and contradictory instructions from BOC be seen as evidence of an intention to force her out of her job?

Whether the exercise of the employer’s right to transfer or reassign employees was carried out within the confines of fairness and justice.

Did BOC’s conduct violate the bounds of fair play that limit the exercise of management prerogative?
Would a reasonable person in Tuason’s position have felt compelled to resign given the circumstances detailed in the memos and correspondence?