G.R. No. L-9519 - Torre vs. Querubin

Saturnina Uy Bien Piao, the respondent in the underlying civil case, claimed ownership of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1574 of the Cadastral Survey of Kalibo, Capiz, with an area of approximately two and a half hectares.
She asserted that both she and her predecessor in interest had possessed and exercised dominion over the property since 1888, underscoring a long and uninterrupted connection with the land.
The land was adjudicated to her in Civil Case No. K-331 (Pablo Menez vs. Crisanta Torre and Roque Morales), where she participated as an intervenor, which subsequently led to her placement in actual and material possession of the property via a writ of execution executed by the provincial sheriff.

On or about August 1954, after Saturnina had been placed in possession as evidenced by the Sheriff's Return of Service and the Minutes of the Delivery of Possession, the petitioners—Eutiquio, Tranquilino, and Benito Torre—allegedly entered the property by force and intimidation.
The petitioners denied Saturnina’s possession and claimed title to the property, thereby provoking a dispute regarding rightful possession and the enjoyment of its products.
The defendants’ actions included continuous disturbances and interference with Saturnina’s possession and usufruct of the land, despite her having taken legal steps and filing repeated demands, including the offer to post a bond.

Saturnina initially sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in Civil Case No. K-576 (filed against the petitioners) to restore her possession and to restrain the petitioners and their agents from further interference.
On February 5, 1955, respondent Judge Jose R. Querubin of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch II, denied the petition for the writ of preliminary injunction, influenced by the opposition of one of the petitioners and by the defendants’ claim of ownership.
Following a motion for reconsideration by Saturnina—and despite further opposition by Tranquilino Torre—the judge subsequently set aside his earlier order on March 21, 1955, and ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

In granting the petition for injunction, the judge relied on evidence that Saturnina had indeed been placed in possession by the sheriff on February 26, 1954.
The decision also took into account the fact that the petitioners were not present during the delivery of possession, and that their occupation of the land only started later when they opposed subsequent proceedings (i.e., the demolition of a house on the property).

Prior to the New Civil Code of 1950, a preliminary writ of injunction was not available when the defendant had already taken complete material possession.
With the enactment of the New Civil Code, specifically under Article 539, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction became available to secure or restore possession during the pendency of an action for recovery of possession.
The case factually rests on the assertion that the petitioner’s right to possession was protected by the sheriff’s delivery, and that the petitioners’ subsequent actions constituted unlawful dispossession.

Whether respondent Judge Querubin was authorized, under the provisions of the New Civil Code (specifically Article 539), to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction during the pendency of Civil Case No. K-576.
Whether the issuance of the writ, which effectively restored Saturnina’s possession by restraining the petitioners from further interfering with her possession, was proper given the facts that:

Saturnina had already been placed in actual and material possession by the sheriff.
The petitioners had knowingly entered the property by force and intimidation after Saturnina's lawful possession had been established.

Whether the petitioner for the writ of certiorari was entitled to challenge the trial court’s order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.