G.R. No. L-15745 - Tolentino vs. Inciong

On December 20, 1952, Miguel Tolentino filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas seeking damages for libel committed by defendant Ceferino Inciong, against whom a criminal case had already been instituted.
The defendant moved to dismiss the case on several grounds: absence of a cause of action in the complaint, the claim being barred by a prior judgment, and improper venue.
Despite the defendant’s motion, the trial court denied the dismissal on February 13, 1953, after hearing the matter, and the action proceeded further.

The case experienced a temporary dismissal without prejudice due to the failure of both plaintiff and his counsel to appear at a scheduled hearing. Subsequently, on motion by the plaintiff, the dismissal was reconsidered and set aside.
The defendant then filed a motion for leave to amend his answer, seeking to include, among other things, the affirmative defense of prescription by alleging that the plaintiff’s cause of action had already prescribed.
The defendant also initially counterclaimed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages amounting to at least P100,000.00. Upon plaintiff’s opposition—which argued that the new matters were immaterial—the defendant reduced his counterclaim to P1,000.00.
Following the withdrawal of the plaintiff’s opposition to admitting the amended answer, the trial court reconsidered its previous order and eventually admitted the amended answer.

On December 13, 1955, after the plaintiff had rested his case, the defendant filed another motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, prescription, and issues of non-suit.
The plaintiff opposed this second motion, contending that these defensive arguments had already been raised in the earlier motion and that filing another motion to dismiss was procedurally irregular given the filing of the amended answer and the ongoing trial on the merits.
In his reply, the defendant maintained that his second motion was a demurrer to evidence and distinct from the earlier dismissal motion.
The trial court denied the second motion on February 16, 1956, and also denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

After the defendant’s evidence was received, the trial court rendered its decision on October 17, 1956, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds of prescription.
The plaintiff, disagreeing with the dismissal, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court noted issues such as the decisive question on whether the cause of action had prescribed (a question purely of law) and an alleged amount issue which exceeded its jurisdiction, thereby certifying the case to the Supreme Court for resolution.

Whether the plaintiff’s cause of action for libel had already prescribed under the applicable laws (both the old Civil Code and the new Civil Code).
Whether the computation of the prescription period from the date of publication (or from when the action could have been brought) was appropriate, given the publication date of July 24, 1949, and the filing date of December 24, 1952.

Whether the defendant’s failure to include the defense of prescription in his initial motion to dismiss constituted a waiver of that defense.
Whether the subsequent amendment of the answer to include the affirmative defense of prescription was proper and did not affect the defendant’s right to rely on that defense.

Whether the civil action for libel must necessarily accrue only after the corresponding criminal case becomes final, or whether it is independent as provided by Article 33 of the new Civil Code.