A.C. No. 242-J - Tobias vs. Ericta

Delfin M. Tobias, the complainant, filed an administrative complaint against Judge Vicente G. Ericta.
The complaint alleged deficiencies in the judge’s legal expertise and a bias favoring the accused in a criminal case.
The Department of Justice endorsed the complaint, lending it a measure of official scrutiny.

On November 10, 1971, Assistant Fiscal Melencio S. Pena of Quezon City filed an information before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City charging two defendants with “Robbery Hold-up.”
The two defendants, Remigio Nadonga y Manahan and Rolando Tupaz y Hernandez, were initially detention prisoners and were arraigned on December 13, 1971.
The defendants pleaded guilty at arraignment, and due to their lack of legal representation, counsel de-officio (Atty. Abelardo Andal) was appointed.
Mitigating circumstances were raised in the case—specifically, the plea of guilty and the evidence of drunkenness presented by Remigio Nadonga.

The criminal proceedings proceeded with minimal rebuttal, as the fiscal did not present any counter evidence after Remigio Nadonga’s testimony regarding his drunkenness.
The court rendered a prompt judgment of conviction after the defendants pleaded guilty.
The judge, while considering the mitigating circumstances, rendered a penalty of one (1) year despite having the legal latitude to impose a lighter sentence.

Respondent Judge Ericta responded to each of the specific charges raised in the administrative complaint:

He justified the penalty by explaining that the law allows for leniency when mitigating circumstances are present, citing Article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
He clarified that the penalty imposed was within the statutory range—from arresto mayor (maximum period) to prision correccional (medium period)—and that even if a lighter penalty was possible, the sentence of one (1) year fell squarely within legal limits.

The judge asserted that there was no legal duty to notify the offended party of the arraignment schedule, nor was there an obligation to send copies of the decision.
He contended that any evidence related to aggravating factors (recidivism, use of a motor vehicle) should have been raised by the fiscal in the information itself.

The judge explained that the term “Robbery Hold-up” used in the information was legally imprecise, noting that the proper legal term should have been “robbery with violence or intimidation.”

The judge justified that under Republic Act 5465—which amended Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code—the law only requires subsidiary imprisonment in the event of failure to pay the fine, not for failure to pay reparation for damage.

The judge’s answer carried not only a legal defense but also a tone of exasperation at the complainant’s lack of understanding of basic legal doctrines.
He emphasized the importance of allowing a proper judicial response to administrative complaints, thereby safeguarding public confidence in the judiciary and upholding constitutional rights such as the petition of grievances.

Whether the administrative complaint alleging judicial leniency and bias is founded on a sound legal basis.

Did the respondent Judge improperly exercise leniency by imposing a sentence of one (1) year under conditions that permitted a lower penalty?
Is there evidence that the judge’s decision was influenced by bias in favoring the accused?

Did the respondent Judge fail in his duty by not notifying the offended party about the set arraignment or sending copies of his decision?
Is there a procedural violation in the adoption of the term “Robbery Hold-up” in the information?

Whether the non-imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the reparation contravenes legal mandates.

Does Republic Act 5465 require subsidiary imprisonment in cases of non-payment of reparation, or is it limited to failure to pay fines?

Whether the response of the judge adequately and understandably addressed the allegations made by the complainant, despite the latter’s apparent lack of legal expertise.