Case Digest (G.R. No. L-21450)
Facts:
Serafin Tijam, et al. v. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, et al., G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, the Supreme Court En Banc, Dizon, J., writing for the Court.On July 19, 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog (plaintiffs-appellees) sued the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy alias Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio (defendants) in Civil Case No. R-660, Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, to recover P1,908.00. The CFI issued a writ of attachment which was dissolved on July 31, 1948 when the defendants filed a counter-bond subscribed by the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (the Surety), which thus became a quasi-party to the action.
After pleadings and trial the CFI rendered judgment for the plaintiffs which became final and executory. Execution against the defendants’ property was returned unsatisfied and, pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 59, plaintiffs moved for issuance of writ of execution against the Surety’s bond. The Surety opposed on grounds of (1) failure to prosecute and (2) absence of prior demand; the trial court initially denied the motion for execution because no demand had been shown. Plaintiffs then made the demand and filed a second motion for execution. At the hearing the Surety’s counsel obtained a five-day period to answer but failed to file any answer, whereupon the trial court granted the motion and issued the writ.
The Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the writ had been issued without the summary hearing required by Section 17, Rule 59; the trial court denied the motion and denied a motion for reconsideration. The Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals, which—despite appellees’ failure to file a brief—affirmed the trial court by decision dated December 11, 1962, holding that the Surety had received notice, had opportunity to be heard, failed to file an answer within the period granted, and thus could not complain of lack of a summary hearing; the CA also held that no separate action or separate judgment was necessary to hold the Surety liable once execution was returned unsatisfied and demand made.
After receiving notice of the CA decision, the Surety sought extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration; the CA granted it, and two days later the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss in the CA alleging, for the first time, that the CFI lacked original jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), effective June 17, 1948, had vested original exclusive jurisdiction in inferior courts for demands not exceeding P2,000 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b]). The CA required appellees to answer; they did not, and on May 20, 1963 the CA set aside its December 11, 1962 decision and certified the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, because the jurisdiction of an inferior court was in issue.
The Supreme Court reviewed the record. It found that the amount sued for was within the jurisdictional limit of inferior courts under R.A. No. 296, but that the Surety, having filed the counter-bond on July 31, 1948 and having actively participated to obtain affirmative relief during the long pendency of the case, waited nearly fifteen years to raise the ju...(Pro-only)
Issues:
- Is the Surety barred by laches or estoppel from raising for the first time, after an adverse decision, the objection that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction because the action sought only P1,908 (an amount within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts under R.A. No. 296)?
- Was the issuance of the writ of execution against the Surety valid despite the Surety’s later claim that the summary hearing required...(Pro-only)
Ruling:
- (Pro-only)
Ratio:
- (Pro-only)
Doctrine:
- (Pro-only)