Case Digest (G.R. No. 192530) Core Legal Reasoning Model
Facts:
The case involves petitioner Tee Ling Kiat and respondent Ayala Corporation, later substituted by its assignee and successor-in-interest, Bienvenido B.M. Amora, Jr. The dispute stems from a 1990 money judgment in favor of Ayala Corporation against Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) and Spouses Dewey and Lily Dee (Spouses Dee). On January 28, 1981, Ayala Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money against the Spouses Dee, who had executed a surety agreement for CMC’s money market line. The RTC Makati Branch 149 ruled in favor of Ayala Corporation in a decision dated November 29, 1990, ordering the Spouses Dee to pay P800,000 plus interests, attorney’s fees, and costs. A writ of execution was subsequently issued to enforce the judgment. In November 2006, the sheriff issued a notice of levy on execution targeting certain parcels of land registered in the name of Vonnel Industrial Park, Inc. (VIP), of which Dewey Dee was an incorporator.
On March 26, 2007, Tee Ling Kiat
... Case Digest (G.R. No. 192530) Expanded Legal Reasoning Model
Facts:
- Origin of the Case
- Ayala Corporation obtained a money judgment in 1990 against Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) and Spouses Dewey and Lily Dee, who had executed a surety agreement for a money market line extended by Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) to CMC.
- CMC defaulted on a promissory note endorsed by AIDC to Ayala Corporation. Ayala Corporation sued CMC and the Spouses Dee for the sum owed.
- The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 149 ruled in favor of Ayala Corporation, ordering CMC and Spouses Dee to pay principal, interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. The judgment became final.
- Execution of the judgment included levy on properties registered under the name of Vonnel Industrial Park, Inc. (VIP), a corporation in which Dewey Dee was an incorporator.
- Third-Party Claim by Tee Ling Kiat
- Tee Ling Kiat filed a Third-Party Claim asserting that Dewey Dee had sold all his shares in VIP to him in December 1980, supported by a cancelled check and a photocopy of a deed of sale.
- Tee Ling Kiat argued Dewey Dee no longer had any rights in VIP or its properties, and thus the levy on the properties registered in VIP’s name was improper.
- The Sheriff had levied on the assumption that Dewey Dee, as incorporator, was still a stockholder entitled to rights in the properties.
- The RTC Clerk issued notice of the third-party claim. The substituted party respondent, Bienvenido B.M. Amora, Jr. (assignee/successor-in-interest of Ayala Corporation), posted a bond for the levy.
- VIP and Tee Ling Kiat opposed the adequacy of the bond and filed motions seeking to nullify the levy and all related proceedings.
- RTC Branch 59 Rulings
- The court denied the motions and disallowed Tee Ling Kiat’s third-party claim, ruling:
- The alleged sale of Dewey Dee’s shares to Tee Ling Kiat was not valid against the corporation because it was not recorded in VIP’s stock and transfer books as required by law (Section 63, Corporation Code).
- The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had revoked VIP’s certificate of registration in 2003, and hence the corporation lacked capacity to sue in 2007.
- The indemnity bond posted was sufficient given the nature of the claim.
- Tee Ling Kiat’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
- Court of Appeals (CA) Proceedings
- Tee Ling Kiat sought certiorari before the CA challenging the denial of the third-party claim.
- The CA dismissed the petition, finding:
- Tee Ling Kiat failed to prove the validity or existence of the sale of shares to him; photocopies of documents and checks were insufficient evidence.
- No evidence showed Tee Ling Kiat was a trustee of VIP or authorized to pursue claims on its behalf.
- Tee Ling Kiat lacked legal personality and was not a real party-in-interest.
- The CA denied the motion for reconsideration affirming its decision.
- Petitioner’s Arguments Before the Supreme Court
- Tee Ling Kiat argued the burden of proof regarding recording the sale lies with Ayala Corporation, not him, invoking the disputable presumption under Section 3(q), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
- He contended that if Dewey Dee remained a stockholder, only the shares should be levied, not the real properties.
- He sought injunctive relief to stop execution pending resolution.
Issues:
- Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in dismissing Tee Ling Kiat’s third-party claim and petition for certiorari on the basis that he failed to prove ownership or interest in the levied properties through the alleged purchase of Dewey Dee’s shares in VIP.
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)