G.R. No. 254194 - Rosita vs. Zamora

Petitioner Joseph Tay Chun Suy initiated a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging six orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-5162 filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City.
The petition sought the reversal of the respondent court’s decisions which had previously been upheld by the Court of Appeals.

On March 26, 1984, Judge Mariano C. Tupas of the RTC of Davao, Branch 12, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 15,970 against Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc., ordering the latter to pay petitioner:

The judgment became final and executory, prompting the issuance of a writ of execution that targeted the motor vessel Sta. Clara I, owned by Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc.
On July 16, 1986, the vessel (with accessories) was sold at a public auction to petitioner Suy for P317,000.00, and a sheriff’s certificate of sale was subsequently issued.
On July 18, 1986, following his successful bid, petitioner moved for the registration of the vessel in his name by ordering the Eighth Coast Guard District of Davao City to effectuate the transfer.

On the same day the registration was ordered (July 18, 1986), private respondent Philippine Trigon Shipyard Corporation (Trigon) filed a complaint in the RTC of Cebu City – Civil Case No. CEB-5162.

The complaint was against Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. (SCHII), Tay Chun Suy (the petitioner), Mayad Shipping Lines, Inc., and the Provincial Sheriff of Davao City.
Trigon alleged that the vessel was originally owned by Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. and had become subject to a mortgage foreclosure by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which later entered into a Lease-Purchase Agreement with Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc.
Furthermore, a Bareboat Charter Party had been entered into on March 10, 1986, whereby Trigon undertook repairs and drydocking of the vessel, incurring repair expenses notably amounting to P1,992,862.55, and claimed a maritime lien for an amount of P1,742,862.55.

On July 21, 1986, Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr. of RTC Cebu, Branch 11, issued a writ of preliminary attachment upon the filing of a bond by Trigon.

The writ led the respondent sheriff to attach not only the vessel but also the petitioner’s bank accounts.
Subsequent orders followed, including an ex parte motion by the petitioner on July 24, 1986, and a joint motion to dismiss the complaint and discharge the attachment filed on July 28, 1986.

On August 1, 1986, an order was issued excluding the petitioner’s other properties except for the attached vessel.
The joint motion to dismiss was denied on August 13, 1986.
A series of motions for reconsideration by the petitioner (filed on August 11, August 14, and October 8, 1986) were all denied.

Petitioner contended that the attachment under Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court was unjustified, asserting:

The applicable ground for attachment in his case should have been under paragraph (d) rather than the applicable paragraph (c), as alleged by Trigon.
He was not a party to the Bareboat Charter Party, thus questioning the sufficiency of cause against him.
The vessel was acquired at an auction for a nominal bid despite its actual value, supporting his claim of an irregular and questionable acquisition.

The writ of preliminary attachment was issued ex parte on mere general allegations without sufficient specific details.
There was non-compliance with the requirement that a copy of the attachment order be filed with the custodian court (Davao RTC) and that proper notice be served.
The enforcement of the attachment interfered with the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao, a court with coordinate jurisdiction.
The appropriate remedy for a maritime lien concerning the vessel should have been an admiralty proceeding in rem and not a civil action in Cebu.

The affidavit and complaint filed by Trigon sufficiently met the details required for the issuance of the writ.
Petitioner’s claim that proceedings ignored due process was unsubstantiated given the emergency nature of attachment cases.

There is a strong presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, including those of the sheriff.
The assignment of the special sheriff and the ex parte issuance were appropriate considering the risk that the property might be disposed of before a hearing.

The court maintained that petitioner, as the highest bidder, was an indispensable party whose rights would be affected by any final judgment regarding the vessel.

Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in upholding the writ of preliminary attachment and related orders.

Was the issuance of the writ under Section 1, Rule 57 justified, particularly under paragraph (c) rather than (d)?
Does the mere fact that petitioner was not a party to the Bareboat Charter Party preclude his being subject to attachment and subsequent proceedings?
Did the ex parte nature of the attachment, without a prior hearing or notice, violate due process?
Is the enforcement of the attachment, including the actions of the sheriff, an interference with the jurisdiction of the RTC of Davao, a court of coordinate jurisdiction?
Should the remedy for the maritime lien have been instituted as an admiralty proceeding in rem rather than through a civil attachment process?