G.R. No. 135904 - Tan y Lagamayo vs. People

Alvin Tan was convicted by the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City for violating Republic Act No. 6539 (the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) concerning the alleged unlawful taking of a Mitsubishi Galant.
The trial court rendered its judgment on 19 December 1994 and sentenced Tan to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment along with other accessory penalties such as restituting the car or its monetary equivalent to the complainant, Philip See.
TAN filed a motion for new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence which was granted on 4 July 1994, yet the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Philip See was denied on 1 March 1995.
The Court of Appeals, on 29 June 1998, affirmed the conviction and the corresponding resolution denying further relief rendered on 6 October 1998.
TAN assailed the decision by petitioning for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, eventually challenging the appellate court’s affirmance.

On 7 November 1992, Philip See, the registered owner of a blue Mitsubishi Galant, allowed Tan to test-drive his car based on their friendship and mutual trust.
During the test-drive, after having received the vehicle for inspection, Tan failed to return the car within the expected period.
Despite repeated attempts by See to contact Tan, including telephone calls and personal visits, Tan consistently refused to accept or return the vehicle.
The delay extended over several months during which See, believing in the friendship and expecting a future return of his car, refrained from immediately reporting the incident as carnapping.

See testified that he initially consented to Tan’s possession of the car solely for the purpose of test driving.
He later observed the vehicle at Tan’s warehouse from a close distance, noting that parts (such as the bumper, a door, and several interior accessories) were already missing or being dismantled.
Despite clear physical evidence that modifications or disassembly were taking place, See did not immediately report the matter, waiting for several months before formally filing a complaint for carnapping on 2 June 1993.

Tan contended that the complaint was instituted by See in order to collect a debt and to exact revenge over personal differences, particularly relating to disputes involving Tan’s girlfriend.
He asserted that the alleged transformation of the test-drive into a permanent taking was a misunderstanding that stemmed from their prior business dealings, which included a complex indebtedness (with Tan owing See P800,000).
Evidence was presented that both parties had even cooperated in attempting to secure a car loan from BPI Family Bank, during which See actively participated by supervising the appraisal and inspection of the vehicle.
Tan further explained that on 19 May 1993, he had already initiated a process whereby his warehouse overseer returned the car to See’s residence, implying that the vehicle was no longer under his control when police subsequently came for questioning on 14 June 1993.

At trial, the court found the testimony and evidence offered by See to be clear and credible, particularly in establishing that Tan’s failure to promptly return the car constituted an “unlawful taking” with the specific intent to gain, one of the essential elements in carnapping.
The trial court rejected Tan’s version of events and underscored that his actions, including his inability to provide a written deed of sale or to produce evidence of an autonomous loan transaction, indicated a willful deviation from the limited test-drive consent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals adopted reasoning similar to the Solicitor General’s arguments regarding unlawful taking, by analogizing the present case to established theft principles from cases such as People v. Roxas, U.S. v. de Vera, and People v. Trinidad.
However, upon review, the Supreme Court scrutinized the chronology and behavioral evidence, noting inconsistencies in See’s immediate actions and his prolonged tolerance of Tan’s possession, which cast doubt on the element of “unlawful taking.”

Whether the elements of carnapping, particularly the unlawful taking element (deprivation of possession without valid consent), were adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Did the facts establish that Philip See revoked his consent to Tan’s temporary possession of the vehicle?
Was the timing and manner of charging Tan with carnapping compatible with the fundamental requirement of unlawful taking as understood in theft and related doctrines?

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the legal principles derived from cases of theft (e.g., People v. Roxas, U.S. v. de Vera, People v. Trinidad) to a crime governed by a special law addressing carnapping.

Should the absence of a written deed of sale and other documentary evidence have been determinative in finding criminal intent?
Could the prolonged period before filing the complaint be indicative of actual consent or at least tolerance by See?

Whether the prosecution managed to discharge its burden of proof, considering the presumption of innocence and the requirement for moral certainty of guilt in criminal convictions.