G.R. No. 148194 - Tan y Chua vs. People

Petitioner Willy Tan was convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal on December 12, 1996, for the crime of bigamy.
The factual background involves Tan’s marital history: he was married to Mildred Gococo-Tan and during that subsisting marriage, he contracted another marriage with Estela G. Infante, which gave rise to the charge of bigamy.

On December 23, 1996, soon after conviction, petitioner filed an application for probation.
The trial court granted probation on January 8, 1997; however, it withheld the release order due to the filing, on January 21, 1997, of a motion for modification of the penalty by the prosecution.
The prosecution contended that under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy was prision mayor—with the medium period ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years—thus rendering petitioner ineligible for the benefit of probation.

On July 10, 1998, the trial court, after reconsideration prompted by the prosecution’s motion, amended its decision and modified the sentence. It set a minimum prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day and a maximum term of eight (8) years and one (1) day.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on July 13, 1998, arguing that the trial court erred by amending its original final and executory decision to increase the penalty.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in its decision dated August 18, 2000, on the ground that petitioner’s appeal raised a pure question of law, which—under Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution and Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure—is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration by petitioner was denied on May 18, 2001, leading to the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Whether the trial court erred in amending the original sentence to increase the penalty after its decision had attained finality and after petitioner had applied for probation.
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it raised only a pure question of law, which allegedly falls under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Whether the proper mode of appeal in criminal cases—when only questions of law are involved—is by notice of appeal or by a petition for review on certiorari.
Whether Rule 65 is the appropriate remedy for raising issues of jurisdiction, or if such issues should be addressed instead through a special civil action for certiorari.
Whether the modification of the judgment by the trial court, which resulted in a harsher penalty, violates the principles of finality and double jeopardy as well as the procedural rights of the accused.