A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508 - Recto vs. Trocino

The petitioner, V. Sy Kian (alias Tan Yao, alias Ong Huat), was convicted by the justice of the peace court of Moncada, Tarlac.
The conviction led to subsequent judicial proceedings culminating in the present original action for certiorari.

Within the statutory period, Salvador Marzan, acting through his counsel (referred to as Amicus Curiae), gave notice of appeal.
The notice of appeal was transmitted via the justice of the peace, who subsequently forwarded the record to the appellate level.
A point of controversy arises when it was noted that Salvador Marzan was not an attorney-at-law, and the record was silent as to whether he was authorized to act or was merely an intermeddler.

The provincial fiscal moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal had not been properly taken.
When the motion of the provincial fiscal was scheduled for hearing, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared.
Out of abundant caution, the court set the motion for a subsequent hearing and duly notified the petitioner of the new date.
At the subsequent hearing session, again, the petitioner and his attorney failed to appear to contest the motion.

The Court of First Instance eventually granted the provincial fiscal’s motion, thereby dismissing the appeal.
Following the dismissal, the record was returned to the justice of the peace.
No exception was raised by the petitioner against the ruling of the Court of First Instance at that time.

Subsequently, the justice of the peace, in the exercise of his duty, called upon the bondsmen to deliver the petitioner to custody for the service of his sentence.
As a result of these developments, the petitioner initiated the present original action for certiorari.

Whether the Court of First Instance had the proper jurisdiction and duty to decide on the provincial fiscal’s motion dismissing the appeal.
Whether the court’s action in setting a further hearing and notifying the petitioner constituted full compliance with due process, thus affording him his day in court.

Whether the petitioner, having been duly notified and having had the opportunity to appear in court, still had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal.
Whether a petition for certiorari was the appropriate remedy when an alternative appellate remedy was available to the petitioner.

Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of First Instance was procedurally valid, taking into account the absence of the petitioner’s appearance at the scheduled hearings.
Whether any compensable error was committed by the court that would warrant the granting of certiorari despite the existence of an adequate remedy.