G.R. No. L-50459 - Suario vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands

Leonardo D. Suario, a long-serving employee of the Bank of the Philippine Islands since March 1969, advanced his career from a savings clerk to the head of the loan section with the designation of Credit Investigator-Appraiser-Credit Analyst.
While employed, petitioner pursued his law studies and received commendations, incentives, and support from his employer for his intellectual advancement.

In March 1976, petitioner voluntarily requested a six-month leave of absence without pay from the then Assistant Vice-President and Branch Manager, Mr. Armando N. Guilatco, expressly for the purpose of attending a pre-bar review in Manila, and was assured there would be no problem with his request.
Subsequently, in May 1976, the new Branch Manager, Mr. Vicente Casino, communicated that the Head Office approved only a 30‑day leave of absence without pay.
Petitioner received verbal advice from Mr. Guilatco (then Vice President in the Head Office) and Mr. Casino, indicating that the petitioner should avail the 30‑day leave with the original expectation that the longer leave would eventually be granted.

On May 10, 1976, petitioner wrote a formal letter to the Bank's President, requesting reconsideration of the leave request; however, he was advised by Mr. Casino to address the matter informally through a letter.
Complying with the advice, petitioner submitted an informal letter to Mr. Casino along with filing a 30‑day leave of absence.
On May 17, 1976, petitioner proceeded to Manila for his pre‑bar review and even sought intervention from the Personnel Manager at the Head Office, who promised to address the matter with higher authorities.
In the first week of August 1976, petitioner received a letter from the Assistant Manager/Cashier, Mr. Douglas E. Aurelio, ordering him to report back to work on the ground that his leave request had been disapproved. Failure to resume was interpreted as a resignation.
Later in August 1976, petitioner received another correspondence from Mr. Aurelio, including a clearance form indicating termination due to resignation or abandonment.
Petitioner, engaged with his bar review preparations and not having filed any opposition, was unaware of the complete procedural ramifications until December 1976 when he was informed at the Bank that his services had been terminated.
On December 13–23, 1976, petitioner exchanged letters with the Bank seeking clarification on his employment status, which culminated in a response erroneously affirming that his termination was effective as of July 19, 1976.

Petitioner filed a complaint on August 4, 1977, seeking separation pay along with claims for actual damages (P9,995.00), moral damages (P300,000.00), exemplary damages (P200,000.00), and attorney’s fees.
The case was initially set for conciliation but was later certified to the Labor Arbiter, who, after requiring submission of position papers, rendered a decision on December 7, 1977.
The Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay amounting to P11,813.36 and dismissed the claims for other damages and attorney’s fees for lack of merit.
The decision of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed on appeal by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on October 9, 1978, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner contended that the NLRC erred in not granting his claims for actual, moral, and exemplary damages (plus attorney's fees) despite findings that his dismissal was illegal.
He alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, citing that the exclusion of such damages under PD Nos. 1367 and 1391 was misplaced.

Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the petitioner’s claims for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, in addition to separation pay.
Whether the NLRC had jurisdiction under Article 217 of the Labor Code to entertain claims for damages beyond separation pay, given the competing provisions of PD 1367 and the later restorative effect of PD 1691.
Whether the petitioner sufficiently proved that his dismissal, though illegal in form, was accompanied by bad faith, fraud, or oppressive conduct warranting collateral damages under the Civil Code.