G.R. No. 179793 - Hidalgo vs. Republic

The dispute arose from the sale of a residential lot and house located at No. 137 Asuncion Street, Morning Breeze Subdivision, Caloocan City.
On 2 September 1965, the Jacinto spouses sold the property to the Sta. Maria spouses for a total of P22,000.00, of which P14,000.00 was paid through the intermediaries Mariano Lucero and Consuelo Tiburcio, leaving a balance of P8,000.00.
When the balance became due on 3 December 1965, the vendors allegedly refused payment and initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
A certificate of sale was executed by the sheriff of Caloocan City in favor of the defendants for P27,940.00—an amount claimed to be far in excess of the contractual obligation yet below the property’s market value.

On 1 March 1967, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order preventing the defendants (Jacinto and Yuson) from consolidating ownership and dispossessing the petitioners.
The case was set for a preliminary hearing initially scheduled on 25 March 1967, then postponed to 6 April 1967 and again to 6 July 1967.
On 6 July 1967, neither the petitioners nor their counsel appeared; as a result, the court denied the preliminary injunction and temporarily set aside the restraining order, only to reinstate it later upon a motion by the petitioners.
During the pretrial on 29 December 1967, the petitioners again failed to appear despite due notice. On the defendants’ motion, the case was declared non-suited, the complaint dismissed without prejudice, and evidence on the counterclaim was received by the deputy clerk of court.

The petitioners attempted to reconsider the dismissal on the basis of their counsel’s late arrival due to medical issues, which led the trial court on 4 March 1968 to reset the hearing for 3 May 1968.
On 2 May 1968, the petitioners filed a motion for leave to admit a second amended complaint, but on the scheduled hearing on 3 May 1968, absence of the petitioners (one attending a “cursillo” and the other tending to a sick child) resulted in another non-appearance.
Consequently, the case was dismissed once more without prejudice on the counterclaim, and the defendants adopted their previously presented evidence.
On 11 May 1968, the trial court rendered judgment on the counterclaim, ordering the petitioners to pay P15,000.00 as moral damages, P4,650.00 for rentals, and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration on the last day for perfecting an appeal (20 July 1968), but the motion was denied on 21 September 1968.

Claiming grave abuse of discretion by the trial court, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with a preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals. They charged errors including:

The scheduling of the case for hearing on 3 May 1968 without a pretrial being held and without resolving the motion for a second amended complaint.
Denial of the petitioners’ opportunity to be heard by preventing their representative’s manifestation on the docketed motion.
The adoption of evidence from a non-existent pretrial to support the ex-parte hearing on the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on 21 April 1969, confirming that the petitioners’ own acts (non-appearance and delay tactics) had contributed to the procedural irregularities.
Despite the issuance and service of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals (rendered on 12 November 1968), the petitioners were eventually ejected from the property, leading them to move for a contempt declaration—a matter that became moot as the petition upon which the injunction was based was ultimately dismissed.
On 7 July 1969, the petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court, consolidating several errors within the issues now discussed.

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion by scheduling the hearing on 3 May 1968 without first holding a mandatory pretrial, particularly in light of the pending motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
Whether the subsequent hearing of the counterclaim, despite the petitioners being non-suited, violated due process or the principle of separability between the complaint and counterclaim.
Whether the petitioners’ own non-appearance and delay tactics justify the dismissal of their complaint and the eventual ruling against them.
Whether the issuance and alleged disregard of the preliminary injunction (resulting in the petitioners’ ejection) merited further judicial redress or contempt proceedings.
Whether the petition for certiorari, as a remedy to contest the trial court’s actions, was proper given that the petitioners failed to timely perfect an appeal.