G.R. No. 188086 - Bello vs. Bonifacio Security Services, Inc.

On September 3, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the petitioners, spouses Alexander Trinidad and Cecilia Trinidad.
On October 10, 2007, the petitioners filed a petition for review challenging the prosecutor’s Resolution with the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On March 3, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an Information for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Fifth Judicial Region, Masbate City.
The MTCC, covering the case under the Rules on Summary Procedure, ordered the petitioners to submit counter affidavits and to appear in court within 10 days upon receipt of the order.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Proceedings, requesting the deferment of their arraignment in view of their pending petition for review before the DOJ.
The MTCC initially granted the petitioners’ motion on May 28, 2009, subject to a condition under paragraph c, Section 11, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Subsequently, on August 10, 2009, the MTCC reconsidered its earlier order and reset the petitioners’ arraignment for September 10, 2009.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, docketed as SCA No. 05-2009, challenging the MTCC’s decisions.
On January 6, 2010, the RTC denied the petition for certiorari.
The petitioners moved to have the RTC decision reconsidered; however, their motion was denied by the RTC in an order dated July 5, 2010.
The RTC justified its decision by noting that the MTCC had set the arraignment over one year and ten months after the filing of the petition for review before the DOJ. It further emphasized that after the amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on December 1, 2000, a 60-day period is the maximum allowable suspension of arraignment in cases pending a petition for review at the DOJ.

The petitioners subsequently filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court essentially claiming that the suspension of the arraignment should persist until the petition for review with the DOJ is resolved.
The petitioners’ claim focused on the argument that the 60-day rule governing the deferment of arraignment was merely a general rule and could be flexibly applied.
The Supreme Court noted that the petition for review on certiorari was deficient as it failed to state material dates—for instance, the date of receipt of the RTC’s order and the filing date of the motion for reconsideration—in violation of Sections 4(b) and 5 of Rule 45, as well as Section 5(d) of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.
In the ensuing motion for reconsideration, the petitioners contended that the RTC order explicitly stated the date of receipt and that they filed the motion for reconsideration on January 2, 2010.

Whether the failure of the petition for review on certiorari to state the material dates of receipt of the RTC’s order and the filing of the motion for reconsideration constitutes a reversible error.

The petitioner argued that the omission was a mere formality and that the date of actual receipt was included.
The petitioners also maintained that the motion for reconsideration, despite its defect, should not invalidate their petition given the liberal construction of the procedural rules.

The application and interpretation of the 60-day limit for the suspension of arraignment under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.

Whether the suspension of the arraignment due to the pending petition for review with the DOJ could exceed the prescribed 60-day period.
The petitioners’ reliance on pre-amendment cases which did not contemplate a strict 60-day limit, versus the current rule in force since December 1, 2000.

Whether the RTC committed reversible error in setting the arraignment despite the pending petition for review.