G.R. No. 143173 - Spouses Ong vs. Parel

Spouses Pedro and Veronica Ong, registered owners of Lot No. 18, Block 2 of the Rizal Park Subdivision in Sta. Cruz, Manila (TCT No. 218597).
Purchased the property in 1994 from spouses Emilio Magbag and Norma B. Pascual.

Socorro Parel, whose grandmother, Visitacion Beltran, is the registered owner of the immediately adjacent Lot No. 17 (TCT No. 125063).
The dispute revolves around improvements allegedly encroaching from Lot No. 17 into Lot No. 18.

On May 25, 1995, the Ong spouses filed an action for forcible entry against Socorro Parel before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15 (Civil Case No. 148332).
Allegations by petitioners included:

The respondent, by means of strategy and stealth, constructed an overhang and a hollow block wall that encroached upon their Lot No. 18.
These structures were claimed to have been introduced without their consent, thus depriving them of possession.
The encroachments were discovered only after a property boundary was resurveyed on August 23, 1994.
Multiple demands were made by the Ong spouses (the last on December 19, 1994) for the removal of these constructions.

Socorro Parel denied the allegations, asserting that the overhang and wall had existed since 1956 and were within the boundaries of Lot No. 17.

The trial court ordered an ocular inspection of the disputed property and designated the Branch Clerk as Commissioner.
The inspection was supplemented by a relocation survey on November 28, 1995, conducted by Geodetic Engineer Mariano V. Flotildes in the presence of both parties.
Findings from the surveys included:

The Commissioner reported that the defendant’s wall protruded about 1.12 meters into the petitioners’ property and that a window sill overhung similarly.
The Geodetic Engineer’s report confirmed an encroachment totaling approximately 4.29 square meters (2.7 square meters for a portion of the house plus 1.59 square meters for the wall).

Rendered judgment in favor of the Ong spouses, ordering the removal of the encroachments and awarding attorney’s fees.

On October 3, 1996, the Regional Trial Court reversed the MTC decision, dismissing the case on the ground that the petitioners failed to prove prior physical possession of the disputed portion of Lot No. 18.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but denied by the RTC on August 1, 1997.
Petitioners elevated the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reaffirmed the RTC’s decision on December 14, 1999.
A subsequent petition for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals was denied on May 4, 2000, prompting the present petition for review.

The petitioners contend that entering or remaining on another’s property without consent—whether through stealth or strategy—constitutes dispossession equivalent to forcible entry.
They argue that such an entry automatically renders the possession unlawful from the moment of entry, subject to the limitations under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Whether stealthy entry without the owner’s consent is tantamount to forcible entry and results in unlawful possession.
Whether forcible entry initiated by such means is distinct from that effected by force, intimidation, or threat.
Whether the petitioners can rely on Supreme Court precedents in unlawful detainer cases.
Whether the respondent, as a private party in a co-ownership context, is the proper party to be held accountable.
Whether the bad-faith character of possession claimed by petitioners was inherited by the respondent, and whether this transformed the nature of the possession.
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals was founded on mere speculation or misinterpretation of the facts.

It was found that the alleged encroachments were made by the late Visitacion Beltran, then-owner of both Lot Nos. 17 and 18, at a time when she possessed full authority to introduce improvements.
The petitioners themselves admitted that the encroachments were discovered only after a relocation survey, raising doubts as to whether there had been any forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
There is an inherent boundary dispute rather than a clear case of forcible entry since the complaint failed to demonstrate an overt act of force, intimidation, or stealth resulting in dispossession.

Whether entering or remaining on another’s property without the owner’s knowledge or consent by means of strategy or stealth constitutes forcible entry.
Whether forcible entry by stealth can be considered unlawful and establish de facto possession only upon a demand by the aggrieved party.
Whether a clear distinction exists between forcible entry by stealth and forcible entry by means of physical force, intimidation, or threat.
Whether petitioners may invoke existing Supreme Court rulings on cases of unlawful detainer to support their claim.
Whether the private respondent, particularly in situations of co-ownership, qualifies as the authorized party in such disputes.
Whether the possession acquired in bad faith by the respondent has been inherited without change, and if so, what its implications are for the claim of forcible entry.
Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on a factual misapprehension, conjecture, or mere speculation rather than a sound application of law.