G.R. No. 135433 - Spouses Crystal vs. Cebu International School

Petitioners, acting as both individual parents and as custodians of their minor children Monica Claire and Frances Lorraine Crystal, sought relief in the form of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Their aim was to compel Cebu International School (CIS) to admit their children and to stop the collection of additional fees labeled as a “land purchase deposit” along with an imposed surcharge.

In the amended complaint filed on August 8, 1996, petitioners alleged that they had long enrolled all their children at CIS, with two already having completed higher levels of education and the other two eligible for advancement in the upcoming school year.
On June 21, 1996, upon reporting to the school for enrollment and having complied with the basic admission requirements, the petitioners received a schedule of fees amounting to P35,187.00 for Grades 4 and 8.
Without a justifiable basis, the school refused to accept this payment unless an additional “land purchase deposit” of P50,000.00 per student (plus a 2.5% monthly surcharge starting from the previous school year) was also paid.
Petitioners contended that this additional fee was imposed illegally and in breach of applicable laws (e.g., B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 5445, P.D. No. 603, and DECS guidelines), effectively coercing them into paying under duress as their children’s education was at stake.

Initially, petitioners made a payment of P25,000.00 in the school year 1995-96 to avoid rejection of their admission application, following which the deposit issue was renegotiated.
Despite their repeated tender of the correct tuition fee (P35,187.00), petitioners were met with further demands including an additional surcharge of approximately P24,746.79 or P24,396.69.
The petitioner’s challenges led to a temporary restraining order being issued by the RTC on August 12, 1996, to prohibit the collection of amounts beyond those due upon enrollment, and set the matter for a preliminary injunction hearing.
A series of subsequent actions saw the refusal of the initial writ; petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied and on appeal the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the writ of preliminary injunction.

The dispute involved conflicting accounts regarding the enrollment process, including the use of personal checks (which had a history of bouncing and being postdated) instead of cash or manager’s checks, as mandated by the school’s policy.
CIS maintained that the “land purchase deposit” was not an additional fee but a refundable deposit agreed upon by all parents during prior consultations, intended to secure funds for the school's predicted relocation when its lease expired.
In the meantime, petitioners eventually enrolled their children in another school, which later underpinned their argument regarding the lack of urgent need for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Whether the petitioners have a clear and unmistakable legal right to have their minor children admitted to CIS despite the additional fee requirements.
Whether the right to enrollment in a private school is absolute or subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable conditions as purported by CIS.

Whether the imposition and collection of the “land purchase deposit” and its attendant surcharge, as a precondition for enrollment, are legally justified despite claims of lacking proper authorization from DECS and other regulatory bodies.
The legitimacy of requiring payment of such deposit, particularly in light of prior parental consultations and the school’s established policies.

Whether petitioners met the three essential elements for obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction: (a) a clear legal right, (b) an actual or threatened violation of that right, and (c) a permanent and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent irreparable harm.
Whether, given the subsequent enrollment of their children in another institution, the prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction retains any merit.

Whether the lower courts (RTC and CA) committed grave abuse of discretion by denying the petitioners’ request for injunctive relief, particularly in light of their payment practices and the established school policies.