G.R. No. 72138 - Spouses Alvendia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Bonifacio Bonamy filed Civil Case No. 5182-M, a collection suit on September 12, 1977, against the spouses Felicidad M. Alvendia and Jesus F. Alvendia before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for P107,481.50 representing construction materials bought on credit.
The dispute arose from the purchase of materials and was compounded by subsequent motions filed by the Alvendias, including a Motion to Dismiss and an Answer with affirmative and negative defenses plus a counterclaim.

On January 6, 1978, both parties executed a Compromise Agreement which included:

An acknowledgment by the Alvendias of the indebtedness of their family corporation, Dona Felisa Village and Housing Corporation.
The binding of the spouses and the family corporation to pay the debt from the first release of funds from GSIS for housing units and lots.
A joint waiver of further claims between the parties regarding the subject matter of the case.

The trial court, finding no conflict with laws, morals, public policy, or public order, approved and adopted the compromise agreement as its decision.

Bonamy moved for the execution of judgment when the Alvendias failed to perform their payment obligations, leading to the issuance of a writ of execution on December 6, 1979.
An alias writ of execution was later sought by Bonamy on April 23, 1980, after acknowledging receipt of partial cash (P20,000.00) and proceeds (P4,000.00) from the sale of the Alvendias’ vehicle.
By virtue of the alias writ issued on May 2, 1980, the Bulacan provincial sheriff levied on the Alvendias’ leasehold rights over a fishpond located at Baluarte, Bulacan, culminating in a certificate of sale executed on January 15, 1981 and a final deed of sale on January 25, 1983.

The spouses Alvendia, dissatisfied with the execution proceedings and alleging irregularities, filed:

An urgent motion for extension of time to file an appeal by certiorari (G.R. No. 72138).
A petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the issuance of certain orders and resolutions by the Fourth Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-04423.

The writs had been levied on properties not referenced in the compromise judgment.
Liability should also extend to their family corporation as originally contemplated.
The execution was premature, given that the compromise agreement allegedly made payment conditional on the release of a GSIS loan.
The subject fishpond was not a proper subject for levy due to its governmental ownership (leased to the Alvendias) and the alleged expiration of the leasehold rights.

The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) dismissed the Alvendias’ petition in its February 27, 1985 decision, thereby upholding:

The propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution and the related orders.
The validity of levying the Alvendias’ property despite the absence of the family corporation as a formal party.
The appropriateness of the execution even without the GSIS fund release being treated as a condition precedent.

The Alvendias tendered a cashier’s check of P100,000.00 in full settlement, later claiming that the remaining balance should be P37,481.50 after deductions for previous payments and the value of a vehicle.
Bonamy refused this tender and moved for a reconsideration of the court’s resolution that allowed for satisfaction of the judgment in cash.
On October 2, 1985, the IAC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent further enforcement of the disputed writ of execution and possession over the fishpond.
Subsequent motions and orders led to:

Bonamy filing a manifest to have the pending petition dismissed in G.R. No. 72138.
The Court consolidating G.R. Nos. 72138 and 72373 by its February 3, 1986 resolution.
The Alvendias’ explanation for failure to timely appeal, attributing their inaction to the confusing orders and procedural ambiguities emanating from the IAC resolutions.

The central issue evolved around whether the judgment debt could be paid in cash after the execution and final sale of the property.
Bonamy contended that the judgment was already satisfied through execution and sale, as the debt had matured and remained unpaid despite ample opportunities for redemption by the Alvendias.
The controversy also involved a noted error in the property description in the writ of possession, where the fishpond’s area was misstated.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the challenged resolutions to amend the writ of possession but affirmed that the judgment, having been satisfied, was final and executory.

Whether the judgment debtors (the Alvendias) can be allowed to pay the judgment in cash even after failing to redeem or timely pay the amount due under the executed judgment.
Whether under the circumstances—and despite alleged irregularities and claims of equity—the execution of judgment and the corresponding sale of the leasehold rights extinguished the Alvendias’ obligations.
Whether the issuance of the writs (including the alias writ and writ of possession) in connection with the said compromise judgment was proper, especially considering the contention that such writs affected properties not expressly mentioned in the compromise agreement.
Whether the error in the description of the subject property (the fishpond) in the writ of possession warranted a reopening or clarification of an already final and executory judgment.
Whether the application of equity to allow payment in cash—despite the lapse of the redemption period and the fact that the judgment had been fully executed—is appropriate in light of judicial and procedural rules.