G.R. No. 138869 - So vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner David So was convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and 8346 for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision imposing a sentence of one (1) year imprisonment in each case along with corresponding fines and costs.

On August 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in CA-GR SP No. 49680, denying the petition for certiorari with a prayer for a preliminary injunction intended to restrain the execution of the judgment.
Subsequent Developments:

On September 25, 2001, petitioner So filed a Motion for New Hearing, invoking Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001 which provided for a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties—specifically, allowing for the imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment at the judge’s discretion.
A Motion for Reconsideration was also filed by petitioner So, repeating essentially the same arguments as in the Motion for New Hearing.
Both motions were denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2002.

On February 11, 2002, petitioner So filed an Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event.

In this filing, he alleged that he underwent a serious triple heart bypass operation on January 21, 2002, at the Makati Medical Center.
He contended that imposing imprisonment on him, given his critical health condition, would effectively amount to a "sentence of death."

Concurrently, petitioner So filed a Motion for Suspension of Execution and Modification of Judgment, requesting that:

The execution of the final judgment be suspended on humanitarian grounds.
The fixed sentence of imprisonment be modified to instead impose a fine—specifically, a fine amounting to double the amount of the checks involved in the case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Consolidated Comment, referenced previous decisions:

Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, where petitioners were similarly convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 and, considering mitigating factors such as advanced age and first-offender status, the sentence of imprisonment was deleted in favor of a fine.
Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, which reaffirmed the approach of imposing a fine in lieu of imprisonment under similar circumstances.

A fine, particularly one double the amount of the check involved, serves the ends of criminal justice while preserving the social utility of the offender.
The discretion in imposing such penalties should be exercised in line with the same philosophy inherent in the Indeterminate Sentence Law, aimed at redeeming valuable human material and preventing the unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty.

The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 8345 and 8346 initially read:

To suffer imprisonment of one (1) year for each case.
To indemnify the offended party with sums amounting to P6,000.00 and P28,600.00 respectively, along with the payment of costs.

Despite the finality of this decision, precedent allowed for the modification or suspension of the execution of final judgments in exceptional cases, as established in People vs. Gallo and other cited cases.

Whether the execution of a final judgment imposing imprisonment may be suspended or modified in light of a supervening, extraordinary event.

The legal question revolves around the court’s authority to alter a final sentence for the higher interest of justice when confronted with compelling humanitarian grounds.

Whether the retroactive application of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001 is warranted for petitioner's case.

This hinges on whether the policy embodied in these circulars—favoring the imposition of fines over imprisonment—applies to petitioner's circumstances, particularly given his serious medical condition.

The extent to which comparative jurisprudence (specifically, the decisions in Vaca and Rosa Lim) can serve as a basis for modifying the penalty imposed under B.P. Blg. 22.

The issue also examines the appropriate use of judicial discretion in light of established guidelines meant to preserve the offender’s economic usefulness while safeguarding public interest.