G.R. No. 185945 - Aglibot vs. Santia

On September 20, 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Health through the National Childrenas Hospital, filed a complaint for eminent domain against SMI Development Corporation.
The complaint sought the expropriation of three parcels of land totaling 1,158 square meters, which adjoined the hospital’s premises.
The expropriation was intended to enable the hospital to expand its facilities and continue providing quality tertiary health care to its growing indigent patient population.

On October 23, 1996, the government filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of an order and writ of possession.
This motion was supported by the deposit of P3,126,000.00 – an amount equivalent to the aggregate assessed value (at P2,700.00 per square meter) of the property in question.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 225 of Quezon City scheduled a hearing for December 11, 1996.

In November 1996, SMI Development Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss and an Opposition to the ex parte motion, raising several concerns:

The complaint was argued to lack or have an insufficient cause of action.
The taking of the property was challenged on the basis that it would not serve the intended public purpose.
The defendant claimed that, instead of expropriation, the government should have negotiated the purchase of the property, emphasizing that the urgency and necessity were questionable.
It was contended that an alternative site—the Quezon Institute located within less than a kilometer away—could better serve the hospital’s needs at lower cost and with less prejudice to private rights.

Additionally, the defendant asserted that immediate issuance of a writ of possession upon mere deposit, as authorized by P.D. 42, was contrary to the due process guarantees enshrined in the Constitution.
The opposition further argued that, even if the deposit was made, Section 2 of Rule 67 (pre-1997 amendments) mandated that the fair market value of the property should be determined provisionally before possession could be granted.

The RTC treated the Motion to Dismiss as an answer under Section 3, Rule 67 (applicable prior to the 1997 amendments), implying that its factual allegations were to be proven like any other pleading.
The trial court’s decision to grant the Motion to Dismiss without allowing evidentiary input from both parties was later characterized by the Court of Appeals as an act done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals nullified the RTC decision, directing that Civil Case No. Q-96-28894 be reinstated and further proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Concurrently, issues were raised regarding the proper remedy (certiorari vs. ordinary appeal) and whether the exception provided under the 1997 Rules for immediate issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit applied.

Petitioner sought review via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, challenging (among others) the dismissal of the complaint and the manner in which the Motion to Dismiss was resolved.
The issues included whether the motion to dismiss and the subsequent evidentiary lapse were grounds for setting aside the RTC decision.
The government, in addition, requested a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, urging the trial court to issue a writ of possession following the deposit, as prescribed by the 1997 Rules of Court.

Whether the remedy of certiorari was proper in the context of the dismissal of the expropriation complaint.
Whether relying on a Motion to Dismiss (treated as an answer) without evidentiary support was a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
Whether an ordinary appeal was available or if certiorari was justified due to the inadequacy and slowness of the appeal process.

Whether the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for eminent domain by alleging the necessity for taking the property for public use.
Whether the dismissal based solely on the unverified allegations in the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was legally tenable.

Whether, under the 1997 Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of possession upon the deposit of an amount equivalent to the assessed value was appropriate.
Whether the previous procedural requirements (as enforced under the pre-1997 rules) were properly supplanted by the provisions of the new rules.