Case Digest (G.R. No. L-7920)
Facts:
Servando R. Lara v. Hon. Froilan Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-7920, May 10, 1955, the Supreme Court, Concepcion, J., writing for the Court.The underlying action was Concepcion Yaldua v. Prudencio de Guzman, Civil Case No. 18393 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On March 20, 1953 the trial court approved a compromise agreement between the parties and rendered judgment ordering De Guzman to pay P6,685.00 with 12% interest from January 1, 1953. A writ of execution issued July 11, 1953 lapsed; an alias writ of execution was thereafter issued on February 4, 1954 and delivered to the Sheriff of Manila on February 24, 1954.
Pursuant to the alias writ, the sheriff levied upon certain personal properties located at De Guzman's residence on April 13, 1954 and posted notice of public auction for April 22, 1954. About thirty minutes before the scheduled auction, petitioner Servando R. Lara (a third-party claimant) filed with the Sheriff a verified third-party claim asserting a chattel mortgage in his favor over the levied goods, attaching a deed dated December 12, 1952 which the petition alleges had been registered in the Register of Deeds for the City of Manila.
Judgment creditor Concepcion Yaldua filed an urgent motion to quash Lara's third-party claim. On May 13, 1954 the trial court ordered the third-party claim quashed and directed the sheriff to proceed with sale; two motions for reconsideration were denied, the last denial being signed by Judge Froilan Bayona. Lara then filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking (inter alia) a writ of preliminary injunction to suspend the sale, a writ of prohibition against Judge Bayona, and a declaration that the lower court orders were null and void. The Court granted a writ of preliminary injunction pending resolution upon bond.
Petitioner argued the court lacked jurisdiction to quash a third-party claim filed with the sheriff by a non-party and that the validity of his chattel mortgage must be litigated in a separate action; he also contended the levy was void because it occurred more than sixty days after issuance of the alias writ. Respondents maintained the court had authority to quash the claim and questioned the authenticity of the mortgage, but the Supreme Court, for purposes of decision, assumed the mortgage valid as between mortgagor and mortgagee.
The Supreme Court considered the timing of reg...(Subscriber-Only)
Issues:
- Did the trial court have jurisdiction to quash a third-party claim filed with the sheriff by a person not a party to the main action?
- Was petitioner entitled to extraordinary relief (writs of certiorari or prohibition) or a permanent injunction when he had another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
- Was the chattel mortgage claimed by petitioner valid as against the judgment creditor or the levy when possession was not delivered to the mortgagee and the mortgage was not recorded before levy?
- Was the levy void for being made more than si...(Subscriber-Only)
Ruling:
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Ratio:
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Doctrine:
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