G.R. No. L-49731 - Sering vs. Plazo

The case involves petitioner Alfredo Sering and respondents Restituto Plazo and Gertrudes Suan.
It is reported as 248 Phil. 315, decided by the First Division of the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-49731, September 29, 1988).

Sering initiated a forcible entry suit (a form of ejectment action) against the respondent spouses.
The suit was filed in the Municipal Court of del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, on October 14, 1974 (Civil Case No. 82).
The action was based on Sering’s claim to actual possession of the immovable property subject of the suit.

Following an adverse rulings against the respondents in the Municipal Court, relief was sought through the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.
In the Court of First Instance, it was discovered that the subject property was owned in common by Sering and other co-owners.
The respondents moved to implead the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs on the ground that they were indispensable parties in an ejectment action.

The Regional Trial Court ordered Sering to amend his complaint to include all co-owners, based on the argument that a suit for forcible entry requires the joinder of all co-owners.
Sering demurred, invoking Article 487 of the Civil Code, which he contended allowed any one co-owner to bring an ejectment suit without necessarily joining the other co-owners.
Because Sering did not comply with the court’s order for amendment, his complaint was dismissed.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Sering was also denied.

Sering elevated the case to the Supreme Court, praying for the nullification and reversal of the dismissal order and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
The Court referenced settled legal principles and prior jurisprudence to assess the issues raised in the appeal.

Whether Article 487 of the Civil Code permits any one co-owner of an immovable property to bring an ejectment action (including forcible entry and unlawful detainer suits) without joining the other co-owners.
Whether the order requiring Sering to amend his complaint to include all co-owners was appropriate in the context of a forcible entry suit where the plaintiff was in actual possession of the property.
Whether the lower court correctly dismissed Sering’s complaint and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration based on the alleged requirement of joinder of all co-owners.