A.M. No. RTJ-05-1946 - Santos vs. How

Complainants: Ligaya V. Santos (Barangay Chairwoman of Barangay 659-A, Arroceros, Manila), Edna Cortez, Girlie Castillo, and Christopher Castillo (Barangay Councilor and Barangay Policemen, respectively).
Respondent: Judge Rolando G. How of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 257, ParaAaque City.
Underlying criminal cases involved alleged ambush incidents in the second quarter of 2001 against the sons of Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Domingo I. Orda, Jr.

In the criminal cases, after probable cause was found in one ambush incident, the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended dismissal of the complaints via a Joint Resolution on June 13, 2002.
On June 21, 2002, the City Prosecutor of ParaAaque City acted on the DOJ recommendation, moving for the withdrawal of the information against the accused.
The trial court granted the withdrawal order on July 5, 2001, though it was later nullified by the Court of Appeals after a petition by Prosecutor Orda, leading to the re-arrest of the accused based on previous warrants.

With the resumption of the criminal cases following the reversal of the withdrawal, complainants filed a petition for bail.
During the bail hearing, on December 14, 2004, prosecution presented SABINO FRIAS—who reaffirmed his prior affidavit identifying the accused.
On December 16, 2004, the prosecution presented its second witness, JONAS AGNOTE, who implicated Ligaya V. Santos as the mastermind behind hiring a gun-for-hire.
Respondent Judge, after hearing only the prosecution’s evidence, declared that he would resolve the petition for bail based solely on that evidence.
When complainants indicated their intent to tender rebuttal evidence (including a request to identify documents on record), the judge branded the request as “misplaced” and rejected the tender of proof.
On December 29, 2004, the judge issued an Order denying bail to the accused, basing his decision on a one-sentence conclusion that the evidence of guilt was strong.

Complainants alleged that the Order denying bail was issued without proper supporting evaluation and was indicative of gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality, and serious misconduct.
Respondent asserted that:

For bail hearings, only the prosecution is required to present evidence since the proceedings are summary in nature and are not a trial of the merits.
Allowing the defense to present evidence would conflate the bail hearing with the full trial process.
His terse conclusion was intentional to avoid a prejudgment of the main criminal case.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) evaluated the matter, noting deficiencies in prudence and a failure to afford the accused their due right to present rebuttal evidence under procedural due process.

A related administrative case (Administrative Case No. 6701) was mentioned by the respondent, involving similar facts.
The Court denied consolidation of the cases and proceeded to resolve the present complaint based on the pleadings filed.

Whether the respondent judge’s conduct in the bail hearing amounted to gross ignorance of the law.

Specifically, whether his practice of relying solely on the prosecution’s evidence without allowing the defense to tender proof was legally sound.

Whether the judge exhibited manifest partiality and committed serious misconduct in his handling of the bail proceedings.

Assessment of the allegations regarding a one-sentence conclusion denying bail.
Consideration of whether the summarily issued decision deprived the accused of due process.

Whether a summary hearing for a bail application, which is not a trial of the merits, allows for the exclusion of defense evidence.

The appropriateness of the judge’s rationale that additional evidence by the defense would effectively resolve the main issues of the criminal case.

The extent to which judicial discretion in bail hearings is bounded by established rules on due process and the rights of the accused.

Whether the failure to allow cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal evidence constitutes a breach of the constitutional right to bail.