G.R. No. 171947-48 - Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

Grace San Diego served as the accountant of Obando Fisherman’s Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) from January 1993 until March 11, 1997.
She was responsible for accounting all business transactions, acting also as cashier and teller, processing check discounting and trading.
She maintained records of cash in bank transactions, summarized daily banking transactions, and was entrusted with a set of pre-signed blank checks—including filling in necessary details such as date, amount (in words and figures), and payee.

From November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, San Diego assumed the role of cashier during Teresita Gonzales’ maternity leave.
From January 13 to January 30, 1997, she acted as teller during Flordeliza Ocampo’s honeymoon, thereby having complete access to the cooperative’s cash vaults and filing cabinets where vital documents were kept.

On March 12, 1997, San Diego ceased reporting for work.
The General Manager, Narciso Correa, instructed bookkeeper Angelita Dimapelis to reconcile the bank book balance based on daily cash transactions.
In the process, Dimapelis, who obtained bank balances from various depository banks (due to missing passbooks and bank statements), discovered that San Diego’s certified cash on hand of Php9,590,455.17 greatly exceeded the audited figure of Php3,712,442.80 as of March 11, 1997.
These discrepancies were reported to Correa and subsequently escalated to the Board of Directors, resulting in the filing of a criminal complaint against San Diego.

An Information was filed charging San Diego with qualified theft, alleging that during her employment (from January 1996 up to March 1997) she willfully, unlawfully, and with grave abuse of confidence, took a sum amounting to Php6,016,084.26.
The charge emphasized that the improper taking occurred without the knowledge or consent of the cooperative, and that the funds were taken under her fiduciary responsibilities.

Upon arraignment, San Diego pleaded not guilty. Pretrial proceedings were waived, and the trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented its expert witness, Alfonso Piscasio—who conducted an independent audit using standard and generally accepted auditing procedures—and several other witnesses including Correa, Dimapelis, Teresita Gonzales, Noel Hilario, and Santiago Panganiban.
The defense offered testimonies from Alberto C. Gonzales and Criselda Sarmiento-Oplas. The latter, acting as the defense’s expert witness, reviewed bank reconciliation statements but only scrutinized monthly conciliation reports without examining the primary accounting books or commercial documents.

On August 20, 2001, the RTC found San Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
The RTC sentenced her to reclusion perpetua for 40 years without pardon and ordered her to indemnify the cooperative in the amount of Php6,016,084.26.
The findings emphasized several factors: her role in preparing and certifying incorrect cash balances, her unauthorized use of pre-signed checks, and other discrepancies in the cooperative’s records.

The CA, after an intermediate review as per the ruling in People v. Mateo, affirmed the RTC decision with modifications—specifically reducing the indemnity to Php2,080,000.00.
The CA’s decision upheld the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence and the reliability of the audit report, while also rejecting the defense’s claim that the discrepancies merely reflected incompetence rather than criminal intent.

Following the CA’s denial of her motion for reconsideration, San Diego filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Her petition raised several grounds:

That the CA abused its discretion in overruling the presumption of innocence based on the evidence presented.
That there was an error in characterizing the offense as qualified theft rather than estafa.
That the penalty imposed was legally flawed.

The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the CA was improperly impleaded, noting that the real party-in-interest should have been the People of the Philippines, and requested dismissal of the petition.

The Supreme Court reviewed the factual and documentary basis of the case, noting that the factual findings of the CA (which affirmed those of the RTC) were supported by the records and not patently erroneous.
The Court gave full faith to the audit report of the independent auditor, which remained uncontradicted by the defense’s expert witness.
It was held that the circumstantial evidence, though indirect, formed an unbroken chain establishing the petitioner’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court also discussed the legal distinctions between theft and estafa—finding that because San Diego did not have the juridical possession of the funds, her actions aligned with the elements of qualified theft rather than estafa.
On the issue of penalty, the Court analyzed the incremental penalty provisions and determined that although the computed incremental penalty would far exceed statutory limits, a logical imposition of reclusion perpetua was warranted, noting that the power of pardon lies solely with the Executive branch.

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review.
The decisions and resolutions of the Court of Appeals (with modifications) finding San Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft were affirmed.
San Diego was sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all accessory penalties and was ordered to indemnify the cooperative in the amount of Php2,080,000.00, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the decision until full payment.

Whether the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the independent auditor’s report and supporting bank certifications adequately established the existence of the alleged discrepancy.

Whether the courts erred in charging the petitioner with qualified theft instead of estafa, given the nature of her access and control over the cooperative’s funds.
Whether the absence of direct personal receipt of funds precludes the application of estafa.

Whether the penalty imposed at trial—and later modified by the CA—was correct and in conformity with the incremental penalty computations under the Revised Penal Code.
Whether the modification to reclusion perpetua was appropriate in light of the maximum statutory limits and the supervisory power of the Executive over pardoning.

Whether the appellate courts were justified in giving conclusive weight to the factual findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the petitioner’s claims of grave abuse of discretion.