G.R. No. 37376 - Samilin vs. Court of 1st Instance of Pangasi

Apolinario Samilin, the petitioner, was on trial for the crime of rape in criminal case No. 12004, styled People of the Philippine Islands vs. Apolinario Samilin.
The criminal case was initiated on April 16, 1931, when the chief of police of San Manuel, Pangasinan, signed and filed a complaint before the justice of the peace, in accordance with Act No. 1773 then in force.

After a finding of probable cause, the case was transmitted to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (the respondent court).
On June 11, 1931, the provincial fiscal signed and filed an information charging the petitioner with rape.
On June 29, 1931, the petitioner was duly arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
The trial began on November 17, 1931, with the testimony of the alleged offended party, a girl of 12 years, and continued with hearings set for later dates.

On January 1, 1932, the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) took effect, thereby introducing substantive changes in the procedures for criminal prosecutions.
Upon the resumption of the trial on January 13, 1932, the petitioner, through his counsel, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The motion invoked Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code (which provides that penal laws are retroactive if favorable to the defendant) in connection with Articles 344, paragraph 2; 336; and 367 of the same Code.

The trial court denied the motion on February 9, 1932, and further denied a motion for reconsideration on February 27, 1932.

Provides that penal laws have retroactive effect to the extent that they favor the culpable, provided the accused is not a habitual criminal.

Mandates that for crimes such as rape (as well as estupro, violation, etc.), the complaint must be filed by the offended party or by her parents, grandparents, or guardian.

Originally provided that crimes like rape were deemed public and subject to prosecution by the government.
The Act was later repealed and superseded by provisions in the Revised Penal Code, particularly by Article 367, with Article 366 ensuring that previously acquired jurisdiction would not be disturbed by procedural changes.

The petitioner contended that the requirement under Article 344, paragraph 2—for the complaint to be filed by the offended party or her relatives—is a jurisdictional prerequisite.
He argued that because the complaint in this case was not signed or filed by the offended party (or her relatives), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to continue the proceedings.
The petitioner further argued that, under Article 22, the retroactive application of this requirement should benefit him by invalidating the commencement of proceedings.
The Court also referenced prior cases (e.g., Clemente Laceste vs. Director of Prisons and People vs. Dionisio Candido) to explore whether the new requirement could be construed as favorable to the accused and whether it was jurisdictional in nature.

The procedural change in requiring the offended party to file the complaint was genuinely advantageous to the accused.
The retroactive application of such a requirement should nullify pending prosecutions that commenced under the old law.

The court observed that although the new procedure might seem to favor the accused by potentially limiting spurious or technically deficient complaints, in practice it did not hinder the government’s ability to prosecute.
The Court also took note of the legislative intent behind Article 366, which was designed to prevent retroactive upheaval of cases that had already been lawfully commenced.

Whether the requirement under Article 344, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code—that the complaint must be filed by the offended party or her relatives—is a jurisdictional condition benefiting the accused.

Does this procedural requirement, when seen through the lens of Article 22 (retroactivity), favor the defendant in a criminal prosecution for rape?

Whether the failure to meet the new complaint requirement renders the trial court without jurisdiction to proceed with prosecutions initiated prior to January 1, 1932, but pending after the effectivity of the Revised Penal Code.

Must a case be dismissed if the complaint was not filed in strict compliance with the new requirement, despite being initiated under the law previously in force?