G.R. No. L-47817 - Sales vs. Court of Appeals

Although both checks bore “payable to cash,” they were made out in favor of Renato Magdaluyo.
The petitioner instructed her bank to issue a “stop payment” order which led to the dishonor of both checks when presented for encashment.

On May 26, 1971, at the instance of Renato Magdaluyo, an information was filed against the petitioner.
The information alleged that on or about January 30, 1971 in Pasay City:

The petitioner, with intent to gain, did issue two checks in exchange for P8,000.00 in cash.
The dishonor of the checks, due to the stop payment order, constituted a fraudulent act causing damage to Magdaluyo.

The petitioner was originally charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

At arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the City Court of Pasay, Branch IV, convicted her not of estafa as charged but of “Other deceits” under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The judgment of conviction dated August 31, 1972, imposed:

A penalty of arresto mayor for four (4) months and one (1) day.
A fine of P8,000.00.
An order to indemnify the offended party, Renato Magdaluyo, with the sum of P8,000.00.

The decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the lower court’s conviction in toto.
The resolution denying her motion for reconsideration.

Alleged violation of her right to be properly informed of the charge.
The contention that the act of issuing the stop payment order did not constitute the deceit required for estafa.

The petitioner also claimed that the P8,000.00 represented the balance of a gambling debt and was extracted under threat and intimidation.
The factual allegations regarding the gambling debt were contested and lacked convincing evidence.

On the evening of January 30, 1971, Sales visited Magdaluyo’s residence to cash the checks for urgent monetary needs.
Magdaluyo, in need of cash, exchanged the checks for P8,000.00 which he later deposited.
The bank’s notification of the stop payment order resulted in the dishonor of both checks.
Following subsequent encounters and promises by the petitioner to pay the amount, no payment was rendered.
A formal demand letter was subsequently served on Sales.

Whether the petitioner was duly informed of the nature of the crime for which she was convicted.

The petitioner contended that she was informed about an estafa charge while being convicted under a different provision.

Whether the petitioner’s act of causing a “stop payment” on the checks constituted the deceit and damage element required for estafa as charged.

This issue questioned if the elements of deceit were sufficiently proven, despite the issuance of checks being a common business transaction in certain circumstances.

The application of the rule on variance between the alleged charge and the evidence proved.

Specifically, whether the conviction under “Other deceits” (Article 318) was valid given that the initial information charged estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d).