G.R. No. 45642 - Salazar vs. Court of 1st Instance of Laguna

Francisco Salazar, the petitioner, instituted Special Proceeding No. 3109 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna seeking the probate of a will allegedly made on May 13, 1924, by his deceased mother, Damiana Capistrano, who died on December 21, 1936, in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The petition sought judicial recognition of the testamentary disposition of the decedent’s estate.

Sabina Rivera, the respondent, filed a pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition" in which she opposed the probate of the first will and instead prayed for the probate of a second will allegedly made on May 11, 1930.
The respondent attached a copy of the second will and requested that the necessary hearing and publications be ordered.
The trial court initially denied the motion for publication and directed the respondent to institute a separate proceeding for the probate of the second will.
On reconsideration, the court reversed its earlier order on March 31, 1937, setting aside the separate proceeding directive and ordering that the respondent’s second will be set for hearing together with the petitioner’s application in the same proceeding.
The expense for the required publications for the hearing was later charged to the respondent.

The petitioner’s principal legal contention was that the court lacked jurisdiction over the counter-petition because the respondent had not initially filed her pleading in the proper manner, notably omitting payment of the clerk’s fees as mandated by Section 788 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act No. 3395).
Subsequent to the issuance of the court’s order consolidating both probate applications, the respondent deposited ₱24 and filed the original of her will on July 20, 1937, thus satisfying the fundamental requirement of delivering the will to the court.

The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration challenging the court’s order to consolidate the two probate applications; these motions were denied.
A later motion for reconsideration was brought by the petitioner’s attorney, seeking a further interpretation of the fee provision, specifically the meaning of the phrase “in each proceeding” in Section 788(g), in relation to the respondent’s obligation to pay the clerk’s fees.
The issue of whether the procedural omission regarding fee payment was jurisdictional, or merely a formal requirement subject to judicial discretion, became a key point of contention.

Whether the court acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for the probate of the second will when the respondent initially failed to file her pleading or pay the clerk’s fees as prescribed.

Whether the absence or delayed payment of the clerk’s fees under Section 788 (as amended) deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the probate of a will.

Whether the consolidation of the two probate applications and the setting of a unified hearing for the two wills was within the court’s sound discretion and proper under the applicable procedural rules.