G.R. No. 128959 - Guingguing vs. Court of Appeals

On February 9, 2009, Lourdes E. Ruiz (petitioner) filed a Complaint for forcible entry with injunction before the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Masinloc-Palauig, Masinloc, Zambales.
The complaint was filed against Reynaldo Armada and Delfin Paytone (respondents), who were alleged to have forcefully intruded on petitioner’s property.
The case journeyed from the MCTC, which initially ruled in favor of the petitioner on December 10, 2012, through the RTC in Iba, Zambales, and then via a review by the Court of Appeals (CA) on September 6, 2016.
Petitioner, dissatisfied with the RTC and CA decisions, raised the issue on appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner claimed ownership of Magalawa Island, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-54730 and a corresponding tax declaration (TD No. 13-00331).
She maintained that she had been in peaceful, actual, and continuing possession of the subject property until December 12, 2008.
On that date, respondents allegedly entered the property by means of force, intimidation, stealth, threats, and strategy.
Respondents were accused of cutting fruit-bearing trees and constructing houses on the disputed lot.
The petitioner’s caretaker was tasked with demanding the respondents vacate the property, but the demands were ignored.

Respondents denied the allegations of forcible entry, contending that Reynaldo Armada was merely continuing the prior possession of his father, Lucio Armada, who was purportedly the rightful owner of a portion of the coconut land on the subject property.
They supported their contention with a tax declaration and tax receipts indicating possession in the name of Lucio Armada/Reynaldo Armada.
They further argued that they were not occupying petitioner’s property as claimed.

The MCTC commissioned Engineer Armando Ventura and Engineer Joel D. Abasta from the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office.
Their Geodetic Engineer’s Report detailed the areas occupied by respondents:

Lot 1: 26,131 square meters (inside TCT No. T-54730).
Lot 2: 687 square meters (a portion of Lot 2814, Palauig Cadastre).
Lot 3: 1,976 square meters (accretion).
Lot 2813: 1,208 square meters (as part of Plan II-4219A, surveyed in the name of the heirs of Alejandro Ruiz).

The report also noted the existence of two nipa houses and several cottages constructed by the respondents.

The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner by affirming her claim based on the evidence of prior possession and ordered:

An injunction directing respondents to vacate the areas and remove all structures built on the property.

The petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove prior physical possession of certain lots beyond what was covered by TCT No. T-54730.
The complaint only pertained to the property described in TCT No. T-54730, denying possession over other lots.

On September 6, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC decision by emphasizing that in an action for forcible entry, the demonstrable issue is the actual or physical (de facto) possession rather than a juridical claim or de jure possession.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA, supported by a Supplement to the Motion, alleging that:

The CA erred in requiring proof solely of physical possession, thereby discounting her title and other juridical acts evidencing possession.

The CA denied these motions on July 14, 2017, prompting the petitioner to elevate the issue to the Supreme Court.

The central contention revolves around whether petitioner successfully proved her prior physical possession of the subject property as required in a forcible entry action.
Petitioner relies on evidence including tax declarations, the presence of an old building, and the acts of her caretaker, while respondents argue that these factors do not amount to actual physical possession.

Whether the petitioner was able to prove her prior physical (actual) possession of the subject property.

Specifically, whether such proof should include evidence stemming from juridical acts such as the issuance of a Torrens title and tax declarations.
Whether the acts undertaken by petitioner, including instructing her caretaker and filing the complaint within one year, suitably establish possession in a forcible entry action.

Whether possession should be strictly limited to physical control and occupation, or if it can be inferred from juridical acts and formalities.