G.R. No. 87110 - Rubio vs. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City

A civil case (Civil Case No. 10077) for ejectment and damages was filed by private respondents, spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King, against petitioner Gil Rubio before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City.
On September 18, 1985, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering:

Petitioner to vacate the occupied premises and restore possession to the plaintiffs.
Payment of P12,800.00 as rental arrears (with legal interest) as of June 6, 1985.
Payment of 25% of the amount due as attorney’s fees.

The decision provided that execution of the order to vacate would be postponed for six months from the defendant’s receipt of the decision, unless the defendant perfected an appeal and complied with the supersedeas bond requirement.

Before petitioner could perfect his appeal, private respondents moved for the execution of the MTCC decision.
A writ of execution was issued on May 22, 1986, and although a KAWAI organ belonging to petitioner was levied, no sale was conducted due to his perfection of the appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision on December 20, 1985, and the Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the judgment on June 23, 1988—with modification regarding the computation of rental arrears.

Upon entry of the Court of Appeals decision on September 14, 1988, the case was remanded to the MTCC.
On November 13, 1988, private respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of an Order of Demolition, scheduled for hearing on December 19, 1988.
During the hearing on December 19, 1988, Judge Roque D. Edmilao issued an order directing petitioner to remove the property within 30 days, with a threat of demolition if compliance was not secured.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the December 19, 1988 order, arguing that:

The demolition order was premature and lacked proper procedural basis.
The MTCC had not issued a writ for execution of the final judgment from the Court of Appeals.
A parallel RTC case (Civil Case No. 8983), which later declared private respondents as bad faith buyers, had altered the situation sufficiently to suspend execution.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, private respondents filed a second motion for a writ of demolition.
On January 27, 1989, Judge Edmilao denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and granted the motion for issuance of a writ of demolition.
Accordingly, a writ of demolition was issued on February 2, 1989.
The writ was enforced on February 20, 1989, leading to the demolition of petitioner’s houses and the turnover of the premises on February 21, 1989.
Petitioner then instituted the certiorari petition on March 2, 1989, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The six-month period to suspend the order to vacate should be computed from receipt of the MTCC decision, implying that execution could not have lawfully proceeded until after that period.
The issuance of the writ of demolition and subsequent demolition of his houses violated the very provision of the MTCC decision.
The decision in Civil Case No. 8983 (regarding ownership issues) constituted a change in circumstances that should justify suspending the execution of the ejectment judgment.

The six-month period was properly reckoned from either the RTC or the CA final decision and had long elapsed before execution.
The motion for reconsideration did not affect the period to appeal, and the writ of demolition, although differently designated, was substantively equivalent to a writ of execution.
The parallel RTC case concerning title and ownership did not alter or suspend the ejectment proceedings, which dealt solely with possession.

Whether a "writ of demolition" is equivalent to a writ of execution for enforcing a final judgment.
Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration can suspend or interrupt the period to appeal an interlocutory order.
Whether the pendency and eventual final judgment in a parallel case (involving ownership/title issues) could be considered a change in the parties’ situation sufficient to justify the suspension of the execution of a final and executory ejectment judgment.