G.R. No. 223654-55 - Roxas vs. People

The case involves petitioner Jose Antonio F. Roxas, and his co-accused, then Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao B. Trinidad, who were charged with violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Article 237 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The charges stem from actions during a public bidding for the construction of the Pasay City Mall and Public Market, wherein allegations arose that the bidding process was manipulated to unjustly favor IZUMO Contractors, Inc.
Two Informations (SB-11-CRM-0249 and SB-11-CRM-0250) were filed before the Sandiganbayan detailing the alleged acts of misconduct by the accused while performing their official functions.

The Informations allege that the accused, while serving on the old Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC), colluded with private individuals (Joselito A. Manabat and Alexander E. Ramos) to award the contract, even though the PBAC had ceased to exist by virtue of the creation of a new Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) under Republic Act No. 9184.
Key evidentiary issues emerged involving:

The issuance and publication of invitations to bid which were allegedly inconsistent with the provisions of RA 9184 and its implementing rules (IRR-A).
The continuation of bidding activities despite the supersession of the old PBAC by a new regulatory framework established by Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2003.

Graft Investigation Officer Mr. Luisito S. Suarez testified regarding the non-compliance of the bidding process with RA 9184’s provisions.
City Treasurer Ms. Concepcion C. Daplas provided background on the composition and duties of the old PBAC, emphasizing her reservations about signing the PBAC minutes due to its de jure dissolution.
Atty. Erwin Edward P. Mendinueto and Atty. Ernestina B. Carbajal testified on documentary evidence relating to the procurement process and procedural irregularities.

The prosecution also submitted documentary evidence, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan through a Resolution.

Roxas filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File a Demurrer to Evidence, asserting that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove the charges against him.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, and later, despite renewed efforts by his former counsel to file a Demurrer to Evidence without leave, the court maintained the procedural stance that such non-compliance effectively waived his right to further present evidence.
Subsequent motions for a new trial or for reconsideration were also filed by Roxas, alleging error and gross negligence on the part of his counsel, but these were summarily denied.

The bidding for the Project became contentious regarding whether the process should be governed by the old rules under EO 40 or by the provisions of RA 9184 and its IRR-A.
Although an initial invitation to bid was allegedly issued on October 3, 2003 (potentially triggering the transitory clause of RA 9184), the subsequent publication occurred after the enactment of the Floatation Ordinance and the effective date of IRR-A.
On December 29, 2003, EO 10 was issued creating the new BAC; however, the old PBAC continued to function and ultimately conducted the bidding on February 4, 2004, despite the obsolete status of their authority.

On November 26, 2015, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding both Roxas and Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges, imposing fixed penalties and disqualification from public office.
The Resolution also ordered that the cases involving the private co-accused, Manabat and Ramos, be archived pending their arrest or surrender.
Roxas’ subsequent petition before the Supreme Court challenged the denial of his motions and alleged that his constitutional right to be heard was compromised by his former counsel’s actions.

Whether the filing of the Demurrer to Evidence without obtaining prior leave of court (after such a motion had been previously denied) constituted an error or prejudice to Roxas’ right to be heard.
Whether the accused’s subsequent waiver of right to present evidence, as effected by the non-compliant filing procedure under Section 23 of Rule 119, was justified.

Whether the alleged gross, reckless, and inexcusable negligence of Roxas’ former counsel in filing the Demurrer to Evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to present evidence.
Whether such alleged negligence is sufficient to warrant a new trial under Section 2(a) of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Which legal framework ought to govern the bidding for the Project: the older provisions under EO 40 or RA 9184 and its IRR-A.
Whether the issuance and publication timing of the bidding invitation falls under the transitory provision allowing the continued use of previous procurement rules.

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the elements of the offenses charged against Roxas.
Whether the trial court’s evaluation of evidence and its allowance for Roxas to file a demurrer (even without prior leave) was procedurally and substantively proper.