G.R. No. 22825 - Testate Estate of Mota vs. Serra

Manotok Realty, Inc., the registered owner of a parcel of land in the Manotok-Ramos Subdivision IX, City of Marikina, Metro Manila, initiated a complaint for unlawful detainer against Amparo Roxas.
The private respondent alleged that:

A Contract to Sell was entered into on September 18, 1961, covering the subject property.
The contract was not duly performed by Amparo Roxas, specifically her failure to pay the stipulated monthly payments, leading the respondent to rescind and cancel the contract on September 14, 1973 (with an effective date of June 25, 1966).
Despite the cancellation and a formal demand to vacate, Roxas continued to occupy the property merely by the respondent’s tolerance.
On August 3, 1995, a final demand was served requiring immediate vacation of the premises, which Roxas allegedly ignored.

Judge Jerry B. Gonzales dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction based on the theory of ejectment through accion publiciana.
The rationale was anchored on the principle that an action for ejectment due to mere tolerance is distinct from an unlawful detainer action.

Manotok Realty, Inc. appealed the MeTC’s ruling.
The RTC reversed and set aside the MeTC’s decision, holding that the complaint was properly framed as one for unlawful detainer.
It issued an injunction ordering Roxas and any persons claiming under her to vacate the property, mandated payment of reasonable monthly compensation for use from November 4, 1995, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs.

Amparo Roxas elevated the matter for review under Rule 42, challenging both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, emphasizing that the factual circumstances distinguished this case—specifically, Roxas’s prior contractual relationship with the respondent—from cases involving mere squatting by unauthorized occupants.

In her petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, Roxas raised a single, pivotal jurisdictional issue: whether a regular court has jurisdiction to try the case or if the matter should have been resolved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
Roxas’s revised argument asserted that since the dispute involves alleged violations of terms and conditions in a contract to sell—a dispute between a subdivision lot buyer and a developer—it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
The respondent contended that:

The determination of jurisdiction must rest on the allegations in the complaint.
Since the complaint specifically described an unlawful detainer (and not a dispute over contractual performance), the regular courts were correct in adjudicating the issue.
Any question of jurisdiction not raised in the lower courts would now be barred by estoppel or laches.

Whether Amparo Roxas is permitted to raise the issue of jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings, given that she had previously adopted a theory favoring an ejectment action on the basis of mere tolerance rather than a contractual dispute.
Whether the nature of the dispute, which involves a contractual relationship (i.e., a contract to sell) between a subdivision lot buyer and a subdivision owner/developer, insulates the matter from the jurisdiction of the regular courts and places it exclusively within the ambit of the HLURB.