Facts:
Roble Arrastre, Inc., petitioner, held Permit No. M92-005 from the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide arrastre and stevedoring services at the Municipal Port of
Hilongos, Leyte and secured municipal Business Permits No. 349 and No. 276 for 1992 and 1993. On 14 December 1993 the PPA granted petitioner a 90-day hold-over authority pending renewal, and on 27 January 1994 petitioner applied to
Altagracia Villaflor, Municipal Mayor of Hilongos, for renewal of Business Permit No. 276; the application was denied and petitioner thereupon filed a Petition for
mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Special Civil Action No. H-237, alleging that the mayor’s refusal was a failure to perform a ministerial duty under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code, that only the PPA had discretion over arrastre contracts, and that petitioner had complied with documentary requirements and paid fees. The mayor defended that issuance of business permits was discretionary, relied on
Municipal Resolution No. 93-27 objecting to Roble Arrastre’s five-year contract because of alleged connection with a shipping line, and counterclaimed for damages and fees. Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that the PPA had thereafter awarded it a five-year contract effective 1 March 1994; the RTC admitted the supplemental pleading, held a pre-trial on 19 September 1994 with admitted factual stipulations, and on 29 March 1995 issued a decision granting mandamus and ordering the mayor to approve petitioner’s 1994 application. The RTC denied reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40621, reversed on 7 October 1996, held that the power under
Section 444(b)(3)(iv), R.A. No. 7160 is discretionary as an exercise of delegated
police power, deemed the principal prayer moot and academic, and dismissed the action; its denial of reconsideration was rendered in a 13 February 1997 resolution. The petition to the Supreme Court followed.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the power of the municipal mayor under
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) to issue, suspend or revoke licenses is discretionary and therefore not subject to a writ of
mandamus?
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied precedent in concluding that the absence of a municipal ordinance conferring specific power did not render the mayor’s action ministerial?
Whether the Court of Appeals properly treated petitioner’s main prayer to compel issuance of the 1994 business permit as moot and academic?
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in relying on
Mateo v. Court of Appeals and
Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal to support its conclusions and in refusing to apply
Symaco v. Aquino as controlling?
Ruling:
Ratio:
Doctrine: