G.R. No. 242837 - Rivera vs. Velasco

Petitioner Eufrocina Rivera is the registered owner of three parcels of land located in Rio Chico, General Tinio, Nueva Ecija, covering an aggregate area of approximately 27,076 square meters.
The properties are evidenced by Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-27012, P-27013, and P-27014 and corresponding Tax Declarations for real estate taxation.
Petitioner claimed acquisition of the properties through free patent applications processed before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR in Cabanatuan City.

In her initial complaint filed on October 21, 2014 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of General Tinio in Civil Case No. 1017, petitioner alleged that on June 21, 2014 she discovered that respondent, Rolando G. Velasco, had occupied a portion (approximately 6,397 square meters) of her titled lands.
The occupation was characterized by the construction of a house by respondent without petitioner's consent or proper authority.
Despite demands for vacation of the property—including a demand letter dated July 4, 2014—respondent continued his occupation, refusing to vacate the land.
Respondent contended in his Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss that he was the lawful owner and had been occupying the property since 1995; he also asserted that petitioner’s allegations regarding her free patent applications and alleged prior possession (since 2000) were deceitful.
Respondent further bolstered his defense by noting that he had lodged a Protest before the DENR on September 1, 2014 against petitioner’s free patent applications alleging irregularities in their issuance.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered its Decision on July 6, 2015 in favor of petitioner by finding that:

Petitioner had established prior physical possession of the subject lands, dating back to 1992, as evidenced by a Barangay Certification and a CENRO Report.
The requisites for an action for forcible entry were satisfied, and respondent’s claim to possession was temporally inferior to petitioner’s established possession.
The defense raising the issue of fraud in connection with petitioner’s Torrens titles was deemed a collateral attack and was rejected.

The eviction of respondent and all persons asserting rights under him from the occupied parcels.
The payment by respondent of a reasonable monthly rent (Php 5,000.00), attorney’s fees (Php 20,000.00), and the costs of the suit (Php 2,245.00).

The decision was appealed by respondent to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and later maintained on October 21, 2016, which affirmed the MTC ruling and dismissed respondent’s appeal.
Following respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration (denied on May 12, 2017 by the RTC), respondent elevated his case to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 42, wherein:

The CA ruled in respondent’s favor by ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry.
The CA reasoned that the controversy involved complex issues of ownership that should be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria rather than in a summary ejectment proceeding.

Respondent’s defense incorporated a collateral challenge on the validity of petitioner’s Torrens titles, alleging that the free patent applications were improvidently granted due to fraud.
This collateral attack, centered on questioning the evidentiary basis of petitioner’s title, was critical to the CA’s rationale for dismissing the forcible entry complaint.
The factual record and the underlying decisions by the MTC and RTC, however, consistently affirmed petitioner’s possession and ownership independent of issues raised by respondent.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry on the ground that the controversy could not be resolved without a definitive ruling on the issue of ownership over the portion of the subject properties occupied by respondent.
Whether respondent’s collateral attack on petitioner’s Torrens titles—by alleging fraud in the issuance of the titles—is permissible within an ejectment proceeding, or if such an issue is properly for resolution in a separate direct proceeding.
Whether the proper remedy in a forcible entry suit is solely the determination of physical possession irrespective of the underlying dispute on ownership.