Adm. Case No. 216-CFI - Barroso vs. Arche

On August 22, 2007, respondent Li Ching Chung—also known as Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng—filed his Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines before the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
On March 12, 2008, nearly seven months after the declaration, respondent filed his Petition for Naturalization with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49, Manila, later amending it on April 5, 2008, to include specific personal details (e.g., birth date and place, residency since arrival, language proficiency, marital status, and information on his trading business).

In support of his petition, respondent attached a comprehensive set of documents including his barangay certificate, police clearance, alien certification of registration, immigration certificate of residence, marriage contract, authenticated birth certificates of his children, affidavits of character witnesses, passport, income tax return, and certification from the Bureau of Immigration among others.
These documents were intended to establish his continuous and permanent residence in the Philippines, his ability to integrate culturally and economically, and his fulfillment of other qualifications necessary for naturalization.

The petition was set for an initial hearing on April 3, 2009, with its notice posted at Manila City Hall and published in the Official Gazette on several occasions (June 30, 2008; July 7, 2008; July 14, 2008) and in the Manila Times on multiple dates in May and June 2008.
Respondent filed a Motion for Early Setting to advance the hearing to July 31, 2008, citing a desire to acquire real estate properties.
The OSG opposed this motion on the ground that it violated Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530, asserting that the hearing could not be set earlier than six months from the last publication of the notice.
The RTC, in its July 31, 2008 Order, denied the early setting and decreed that the earliest possible hearing should occur on December 15, 2008, based on the last newspaper publication, though later procedural orders reinstated the April 3, 2009 hearing date.

During the hearing, respondent testified and presented two character witnesses to attest to his good moral character and proper conduct during his residency in the country.
On June 3, 2009, the RTC granted his petition for naturalization, declaring him a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
The decree was conditioned upon compliance with certain requirements (e.g., continuous residence in the Philippines, maintaining a lawful calling, no criminal convictions, and absence of behavior prejudicial to national interest) and provided that the decision would not become executory until two years after its promulgation and upon a proper subsequent hearing.

The OSG appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), challenging both procedural and substantive aspects of the naturalization process.
On June 30, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, noting that despite the petition being filed in less than one year from the declaration of intention, this defect was not fatal.
The CA further confirmed the respondent’s arrival in the Philippines using corroborative evidence (e.g., the Bureau of Immigration’s certification and a passport stamp) and emphasized that the Republic participated fully in all stages of the proceedings, ensuring due process.

The OSG argued that respondent’s petition contained fatal jurisdictional defects, particularly:

Filing the petition within the one-year period instead of after;
Failure to attach the indispensable Certificate of Arrival; and
Non-compliance with the mandated publication and posting requirements under CA No. 473.

The OSG contended that these defects were not mere technicalities but struck at the core of the statutory requirements regulating naturalization, which are designed to protect public interest by ensuring that only those who strictly comply may be granted citizenship.
Citing seminal cases such as Tan v. Republic and Republic v. Go Bon Lee, the government underscored that substantial compliance with these statutory provisions is insufficient, and any departure from the clear requirements is fatal to the naturalization process.

The matter is situated within a body of jurisprudence that views naturalization as a discretionary act—an act of grace by the state—requiring strict adherence to all legal prerequisites.
The statutory framework, particularly Section 5 of CA No. 473, unequivocally mandates a waiting period of one year between the filing of the Declaration of Intention and the Petition for Naturalization.
The failure to meet these requirements not only undermines the integrity of the process but, as held in the cited cases, necessitates the dismissal or severance of the naturalization proceeding, irrespective of other merits of the applicant’s case.

Whether filing the petition for naturalization within one year from the declaration of intention (and not after the prescribed one-year period) constitutes a fatal defect subject to dismissal.

Whether the failure to attach the Certificate of Arrival—an indispensable part of the declaration proving lawful entry—invalidates the petition despite other evidence indicating the respondent’s presence in the country.

Whether deviations in the notice and publication process (such as the attempted early setting of the hearing and insufficient publication intervals) affect the validity of the naturalization proceedings.

Whether the principle of substantial compliance may be invoked to excuse the respondent’s non-compliance with the jurisdictional and procedural requirements mandated by CA No. 473.

Whether the presence of any jurisdictional defect, particularly those involving timing and documentation, is fatal to the naturalization process, thereby justifying the dismissal of the petition.